Springer Science and Business Media LLC
SCOPUS (2022-2025)
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Các bài báo tiêu biểu
Lewis and Quine in context
Tập 2 Số 2
AbstractRobert Sinclair’s Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the
Analytic-Synthetic Distinction persuasively argues that Quine’s epistemology was
deeply influenced by C. I. Lewis’s pragmatism. Sinclair’s account raises the
question why Quine himself frequently downplayed Lewis’s influence. Looking
back, Quine has always said that Rudolf Carnap was his “greatest teacher” and
that his 1933 meeting wi...
Knowledge and acceptance
Tập 2 Số 1
AbstractIn a recent paper, Jie Gao (Synthese 194:1901–17, 2017) has argued that
there are acceptance-based counterexamples to the knowledge norm for practical
reasoning (KPR). KPR tells us that we may only rely on known propositions in
practical reasoning, yet there are cases of practical reasoning in which we seem
to permissibly rely on merely accepted propositions, which fail to constitute
knowl...
Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism
AbstractI revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic
Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and
Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy
as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her
critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative
forms, and ...
Science is more than knowing
AbstractBird’s new book, Knowing Science, provides an exemplar of how to do
epistemology and philosophy of science together. While I wholeheartedly
appreciate his attempt to bridge the gap between epistemology and philosophy of
science and find his project promising, I am not convinced by the central thesis
of the book that knowledge plays a central role in science. In this article, I
focus on Bir...
Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori
AbstractIn this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and
discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic
possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.