Précis of Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry

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Miyazono, K. (2015). Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 561–573.

Miyazono, K. (2019). Delusions and beliefs: A philosophical inquiry. Routledge.

Miyazono, K., & McKay, R. (2019). Explaining delusional beliefs: A hybrid model. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 24(5), 335–346.

Schwitzgebel, E. (2012). Mad belief? Neuroethics, 5(1), 13–17.

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Woodward, T. S., Moritz, S., Cuttler, C., & Whitman, J. C. (2006). The contribution of a cognitive bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) to delusions in schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 28(4), 605–617.