Incoherence, inquiry, and suspension

Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Conor McHugh1
1Philosophy, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

Tóm tắt

AbstractI consider two possible evidentialist responses to Schmidt. According to the first, all of the reason-giving work in the relevant cases is being done by evidence. According to the second, even if the ‘incoherence fact’ sometimes provides a reason, what it provides a reason for is not a doxastic attitude, or at least not one that is an alternative to belief. I argue that the first response is not satisfying, but the second is defensible.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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