Beliefs, delusions, and dry-functionalism

Christopher Atkinson1
1Philosophy Department, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong

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Tài liệu tham khảo

Atkinson, C. J. MS. Belief, epistemology, and evolution.

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Davies, P. S. (2001). Norms of nature: Naturalism and the nature of functions. MIT Press.

Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories: New foundations for realism. The MIT Press.

Millikan, R. G. (1989). In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56(2), 288.

Miyazono, Kengo (2018). Delusions and beliefs: A philosophical inquiry. Routledge.

Shah, N. (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review, 112(4), 447–482.

Sullivan-Bissett (2016). Malfunction defended. Synthese:1–22

Velleman, David (2000). On the aim of belief. In The possibility of practical reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81.