Management Science

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Coordinating Mechanisms in Care Provider Groups: Relational Coordination as a Mediator and Input Uncertainty as a Moderator of Performance Effects
Management Science - Tập 48 Số 11 - Trang 1408-1426 - 2002
Jody Hoffer Gittell
This paper proposes a model of how coordinating mechanisms work, and tests it in the context of patient care. Consistent with organization design theory, the performance effects of boundary spanners and team meetings were mediated by relational coordination, a communication- and relationship-intensive form of coordination. Contrary to organization design theory, however, the performance effects of routines were also mediated by relational coordination. Rather than serving as a replacement for interactions, as anticipated by organization design theory, routines work by enhancing interactions among participants. Likewise, all three coordinating mechanisms, including routines, were found to be increasingly effective under conditions of uncertainty.
Optimal Resource Use Over Time with an Application to Ground Water
Management Science - Tập 11 Số 1 - Trang 80-93 - 1964
Oscar R. Burt
This paper is concerned with optimal allocation over time of a single resource which is either fixed in supply or only partially renewable at a point in time. Some resources which fall in this category are mineral deposits, ground water, petroleum, wildlife, and fish. A functional equation is obtained from a dynamic programming formulation of the problem. This functional equation is used to derive approximate decision rules for resource use as a function of current supply. The results are applied to ground water storage control and tested empirically by comparison with a decision rule obtained by detailed numerical methods.
Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design
Management Science - Tập 49 Số 1 - Trang 1-20 - 2003
Wei–yu Kevin Chiang, Dilip Chhajed, James D. Hess
The advent of e-commerce has prompted many manufacturers to redesign their traditional channel structures by engaging in direct sales. The model conceptualizes the impact of customer acceptance of a direct channel, the degree to which customers accept a direct channel as a substitute for shopping at a traditional store, on supply-chain design. The customer acceptance of a direct channel can be strong enough that an indepent manufacturer would open a direct channel to compete with its own retailers. Here, direct marketing is used for strategic channel control purposes even though it is inefficient on its own and, surprisingly, it can profit the manufacturer even when so direct sales occur. Specifically, we construct a price-setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer. Direct marketing, which indirectly increases the flow of profits through the retail channel, helps the manufacturer improve overall profitability by reducing the degree of inefficient price double marginalization. While operated by the manufacturer to constrain the retailer's pricing behavior, the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction. This combination of manufacturer pull and push can benefit the retailer in equilibrium. Finally, we show that the mere threat of introducing the direct channel can increase the manufacturer's negotiated share of cooperative profits even if price efficiency is obtained by using other business practices.
User Involvement and MIS Success: A Review of Research
Management Science - Tập 30 Số 5 - Trang 586-603 - 1984
Blake Ives, Margrethe H. Olson
User involvement in the design of computer-based information systems is enthusiastically endorsed in the prescriptive literature. However determining when and how much, or even if, user involvement is appropriate are questions that have received inadequate research attention. In this paper research that examines the link between user involvement and indicators of system success is reviewed. The authors find that much of the existing research is poorly grounded in theory and methodologically flawed; as a result, the benefits of user involvement have not been convincingly demonstrated. Until higher quality studies are completed intuition, experience, and unsubstantiated prescriptions will remain the practitioner's best guide to the determination of appropriate levels and types of user involvement; these will generally suggest that user involvement is appropriate for unstructured problems or when user acceptance is important. In order to foster higher quality integrated research and to increase understanding of the user involvement-system success relationship, the authors present the following: a conceptual framework into which previous research has been mapped that can provide direction to future efforts; a review of existing measures of user involvement and system success; a set of variables that have been proposed as potentially impacting the relationship between user involvement and system success.
A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms
Management Science - Tập 25 Số 9 - Trang 833-848 - 1979
William G. Ouchi
The problem of organization is the problem of obtaining cooperation among a collection of individuals or units who share only partially congruent objectives. When a team of individuals collectively produces a single output, there develops the problem of how to distribute the rewards emanating from that output in such a manner that each team member is equitably rewarded. If equitable rewards are not forthcoming, members will, in future cooperative ventures, adjust their efforts in such a manner that all will be somewhat worse off (cf. Simon [Simon, H. A. 1964. On the concept of organizational goal. Admin. Sci. Quart. 9 (1, June) 1–22.], Marschak [Marschak, Thomas A. 1965. Economic theories of organization. J. G. March, ed. Handbook of Organizations. Rand McNally, Chicago, Ill., 423–450.], Alchian and Demsetz [Alchian, Armen A., Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. 62 777–795.). It is the objective of this paper to describe three fundamentally different mechanisms through which organizations can seek to cope with this problem of evaluation and control. The three will be referred to as markets, bureaucracies, and clans. In a fundamental sense, markets deal with the control problem through their ability to precisely measure and reward individual contributions; bureaucracies rely instead upon a mixture of close evaluation with a socialized acceptance of common objectives; and clans rely upon a relatively complete socialization process which effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals. This paper explores the organizational manifestations of these three approaches to the problem of control. The paper begins with an example from a parts distribution division of a major company which serves to give some flesh to what might otherwise be overly-abstract arguments. Through the example, each of the three mechanisms is explicated briefly and discussed in terms of two prerequisite conditions, one social and the other informational. The more concrete organization design features of the three forms are considered, along with some consideration of the unique costs accompanying each form.
Managing I/S Design Teams: A Control Theories Perspective
Management Science - Tập 38 Số 6 - Trang 757-777 - 1992
John C. Henderson, Soonchul Lee
The control relationship between project managers and team members is a central aspect of the working of any Information System (I/S) design team. This paper combines research on managerial control and team-member control in order to explore a range of control behaviors that can affect the performance of an I/S design team. Measures are developed and validated for managerial control and team-member control from both an outcome and a process perspective. Results from a study of 41 actual I/S design teams indicate that high-performing teams exhibit high process control by managers and high outcome control by team members. The results also support the proposition that both managerial and team-member control coexists and that increases in the total level of control behavior is positively correlated with performance.
One-Switch Utility Functions and a Measure of Risk
Management Science - Tập 34 Số 12 - Trang 1416-1424 - 1988
David E. Bell
Consider the relative attractiveness to a decision maker of two financial gambles as the wealth of that individual varies. It may seem reasonable that either one alternative should be preferred for all wealth levels or that there exists a unique critical wealth level at which the decision maker switches from preferring one alternative to the other. Decreasing risk aversion is not sufficient for this property to hold: we identify the small class of utility functions for which it does. We show how the property leads naturally to a measure of risk. The results of this paper apply equally well to discounting functions for cash flows: one-switch discount functions permit at most one change in preference between cash flows as all payoffs are deferred in time.
An Empirical Analysis of the Product-Process Matrix
Management Science - Tập 42 Số 11 - Trang 1576-1591 - 1996
M. Hossein Safizadeh, Larry P. Ritzman, Deven Sharma, Craig Wood
Process choice, a major part of operations strategy, is a key decision that links operations to business strategy. Hayes and Wheelwright, among others, argue that the emphasis given to product customization and other competitive priorities should agree with process choice. Our empirical study investigates whether firms actually link their process choice to product customization and other competitive priorities as hypothesized, and whether compatible decision patterns lead to better performance. Analysis of data collected from managers at 144 U.S. manufacturing plants shows a strong correlation between process choice, product customization, and competitive priorities. Process choice is highly related with the degree of product customization, and also with the emphasis placed on the quality and cost competitive priorities. Job shops and batch shops tend to have more product customization, higher costs, and higher quality. Some continuous flow shops use part commonality and flexible automation to achieve more customization than would otherwise be expected. Without these initiatives, customization in continuous flow shops results in weak performance.
Collateral Misreporting in the Residential Mortgage-Backed Security Market
Management Science - Tập 67 Số 5 - Trang 2729-2750 - 2021
Samuel Kruger, Gonzalo Maturana
Securitized mortgage appraisals routinely target pre-specified valuations, 45% of purchase loan appraisals exactly equal purchase prices, and appraisals virtually never fall below purchase prices. As a result, appraisals exceed automated valuation model (AVM) valuations 60% of the time and are 5% higher than AVM valuations on average. High appraisals and indicators of appraisal targeting predict loan delinquency and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) losses and are priced at the loan level through higher interest rates, but have essentially no impact on RMBS pricing. Selection bias simulations and unfunded loan application appraisals indicate that high appraisals are intentional. The extent to which appraisals exceed AVM valuations varies across loan officers, mortgage brokers, and appraisers, and high appraisals are associated with more repeat business for appraisers, potentially incentivizing appraisers to inflate their appraisals. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance.
The Shape and Term Structure of the Index Option Smirk: Why Multifactor Stochastic Volatility Models Work So Well
Management Science - Tập 55 Số 12 - Trang 1914-1932 - 2009
Peter Christoffersen, Steven L. Heston, Kris Jacobs
State-of-the-art stochastic volatility models generate a “volatility smirk” that explains why out-of-the-money index puts have high prices relative to the Black-Scholes benchmark. These models also adequately explain how the volatility smirk moves up and down in response to changes in risk. However, the data indicate that the slope and the level of the smirk fluctuate largely independently. Although single-factor stochastic volatility models can capture the slope of the smirk, they cannot explain such largely independent fluctuations in its level and slope over time. We propose to model these movements using a two-factor stochastic volatility model. Because the factors have distinct correlations with market returns, and because the weights of the factors vary over time, the model generates stochastic correlation between volatility and stock returns. Besides providing more flexible modeling of the time variation in the smirk, the model also provides more flexible modeling of the volatility term structure. Our empirical results indicate that the model improves on the benchmark Heston stochastic volatility model by 24% in-sample and 23% out-of-sample. The better fit results from improvements in the modeling of the term structure dimension as well as the moneyness dimension.
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