Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

Can higher level cognition directly influence visual spatial perception? Many recent studies have claimed so, on the basis that manipulating cognitive factors (e.g., morality, emotion, action capacity) seems to directly affect perception. However, Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016) argued that such studies often fall prey to at least one of six pitfalls. They further argued that if an effect could be accounted for by any of these pitfalls, it is not a true demonstration of a top-down influence of cognition on perception. In response to Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016), Witt (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(4), 999–1021, 2017) discussed four action-specific scaling effects which, she argued, withstand all six pitfalls and thus demonstrate true perceptual changes caused by differences in action capacity. Her third case study was the influence of apparent grasping capacity on perceived object size. In this article, we provide new interpretations of previous findings and assess recent data which suggest that this effect is not, in fact, perceptual. Instead, we believe that many earlier studies showing this effect are subject to one or more of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016). We substantiate our claims with recent empirical evidence from our laboratory which suggests that neither actual nor perceived grasping capacity directly influence perceived object size. We conclude that studies manipulating grasping capacity do not provide evidence for the action-specific account because variation in this factor does not directly influence size perception.

We investigated the effects of adaptation to mouth shapes associated with different spoken sounds (sustained /m/ or /u/) on visual perception of lip speech. Participants were significantly more likely to label ambiguous faces on an /m/-to-/u/ continuum as saying /u/ following adaptation to /m/ mouth shapes than they were in a preadaptation test. By contrast, participants were significantly less likely to label the ambiguous faces as saying /u/ following adaptation to /u/ mouth shapes than they were in a preadaptation test. The magnitude of these aftereffects was equivalent when the same individual was shown in the adaptation and test phases of the experiment and when different individuals were presented in the adaptation and test phases. These findings present novel evidence that adaptation to natural variations in facial appearance influences face perception, and they extend previous research on face aftereffects to visual perception of lip speech.

Very fast extraction of global structural and statistical regularities allows us to access the “gist”—the basic meaning—of real-world images in as little as 20 ms. Gist processing is central to efficient assessment and orienting in complex environments. This ability is probably based on our extensive experience with the regularities of the natural world. If that is so, would experts develop an ability to extract the gist from the artificial stimuli (e.g., medical images) with which they have extensive visual experience? Anecdotally, experts report some ability to categorize images as normal or abnormal before actually finding an abnormality. We tested the reality of this perception in two expert populations: radiologists and cytologists. Observers viewed brief (250- to 2,000-ms) presentations of medical images. The presence of abnormality was randomized across trials. The task was to rate the abnormality of an image on a 0–100 analog scale and then to attempt to localize that abnormality on a subsequent screen showing only the outline of the image. Both groups of experts had above-chance performance for detecting subtle abnormalities at all stimulus durations (cytologists d' ≈ 1.2 and radiologists d' ≈ 1), whereas the nonexpert control groups did not differ from chance (d' ≈ 0.23, d' ≈ 0.25). Furthermore, the experts’ ability to localize these abnormalities was at chance levels, suggesting that categorization was based on a global signal, and not on fortuitous attention to a localized target. It is possible that this global signal could be exploited to improve clinical performance.

Retrieval practice with particular items in memory may result in decreased recall of different, semantically related, items. This retrieval-induced forgetting effect has been demonstrated in studies using explicit memory tests. Anderson and Spellman (1995) have attributed retrieval-induced forgetting to inhibitory mechanisms. This hypothesis predicts similar effects in implicit memory tasks. In our first experiment, using Anderson and Spellman’s original paradigm, retrieval-induced forgetting was found using an explicit memory test with independent extralist retrieval cues. In our second experiment, using the same materials, retrieval-induced forgetting was also found using an implicit memory test with independent extralist retrieval cues, but only for participants who were aware of the relationship between the study and practice phase on the one hand, and the test phase of the experiment on the other. Thus, test awareness seems to mediate retrieval-induced forgetting in implicit memory tasks.

It has often been asserted, by both men and women, that men are funnier. We explored two possible explanations for such a view, first testing whether men, when instructed to be as funny as possible, write funnier cartoon captions than do women, and second examining whether there is a tendency to falsely remember funny things as having been produced by men. A total of 32 participants, half from each gender, wrote captions for 20 cartoons. Raters then indicated the humor success of these captions. Raters of both genders found the captions written by males funnier, though this preference was significantly stronger among the male raters. In the second experiment, male and female participants were presented with the funniest and least funny captions from the first experiment, along with the caption author’s gender. On a memory test, both females and males disproportionately misattributed the humorous captions to males and the nonhumorous captions to females. Men might think men are funnier because they actually find them so, but though women rated the captions written by males slightly higher, our data suggest that they may regard men as funnier more because they falsely attribute funny things to them.

Throughout their lifetime, adults learn new words in their native lannguage, and potentially also in a second language. However, they do so with variable levels of success. In the auditory word learning literature, some of this variability has been attributed to phonological skills, including decoding and phonological short-term memory. Here I examine how the relationship between phonological skills and word learning applies to the visual modality. I define the availability of phonology in terms of (1) the extent to which it is biased by the learning environment, (2) the characteristics of the words to be learned, and (3) individual differences in phonological skills. Across these three areas of research, visual word learning improves when phonology is made more available to adult learners, suggesting that phonology can facilitate learning across modalities. However, the facilitation is largely specific to alphabetic languages, which have predictable sublexical correspondences between orthography and phonology. Therefore, I propose that phonology bootstraps visual word learning by providing a secondary code that constrains and refines developing orthographic representations.

A new theoretical framework for the testing effect—the finding that retrieval practice is usually more effective for learning than are other strategies—is proposed, the empirically supported tenet of which is that separate memories form as a consequence of study and test events. A simplest case quantitative model is derived from that framework for the case of cued recall. With no free parameters, that model predicts both proportion correct in the test condition and the magnitude of the testing effect across 10 experiments conducted in our laboratory, experiments that varied with respect to material type, retention interval, and performance in the restudy condition. The model also provides the first quantitative accounts of (a) the testing effect as a function of performance in the restudy condition, (b) the upper bound magnitude of the testing effect, (c) the effect of correct answer feedback, (d) the testing effect as a function of retention interval for the cases of feedback and no feedback, and (e) the effect of prior learning method on subsequent learning through testing. Candidate accounts of several other core phenomena in the literature, including test-potentiated learning, recognition versus cued recall training effects, cued versus free recall final test effects, and other select transfer effects, are also proposed. Future prospects and relations to other theories are discussed.

We report two experiments in which the two-rectangles method of Egly, Driver, and Rafal (1994) was used to test whether object-specific attentional cuing advantages can spread to hidden portions of occluded objects. Displays began with portions of two rectangles hidden by a third, occluding object. One end of one of the two rectangles was cued, after which the occluder rotated around its center point and target stimuli were presented. In one condition, the occluder was removed from in front of the other objects, either by rotating away from them (Experiment 1B) or by rotating and then slipping behind them (Experiment 1B). In another condition, the occluder first rotated away but then returned to its original position. In both experiments, an object-specific cuing advantage occurred in the occluderremoved condition for targets that appeared in what had been hidden locations of the cued object. No analogous advantage occurred in the occluder-returned condition.