Memory and Cognition

In this study, we investigated the interaction of three different sources of task activation in precued task switching. We distinguished (1) intentional, cue-based task activation from two other, involuntary sources of activation: (2) persisting activation from the preceding task and (3) stimulus-based task activation elicited by the task stimulus itself. We assumed that cue-based task activation increases as a function of cue—stimulus interval (CSI) and that task activation from the preceding trial decays as a function of response—stimulus interval. Stimulus-based task activation is thought to be due to involuntary retrieval of stimulus-associated tasks. We manipulated stimulus-based task activation by mapping each of the stimuli consistently to only one or the other of the two tasks. After practice, we reversed this mapping in order to test the effects of item-specific stimulus—task association. The mapping reversal resulted in increased reaction times and increased task shift costs. These stimulus-based priming effects were markedly reduced with a long CSI, relative to a short CSI, suggesting that stimulus-based priming shows up in performance principally when competition between tasks is high and that cue-based task activation reduces task competition. In contrast, lengthening the response—cue interval (decay time) reduced shift costs but did not reduce the stimulus-based priming effect. The data are consistent with separable stimulus-related and response-related components of task activation. Further theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

The parity effect in arithmetic problem verification tasks refers to faster and more accurate judgments for false equations when the odd/even status of the proposed answer mismatches that of the correct answer. In two experiments, we examined whether the proportion of incorrect answers that violated parity or the number of even operands in the problem affected the magnitude of these effects. Experiment 1 showed larger parity effects for problems with two even operands and larger parity effects during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and varied the proportion of problems violating parity. Larger parity effects were obtained when more of the false problems violated parity. Moreover, all three effects combined to show the greatest parity effects in conditions with a high proportion of parity violations in problems containing two even operands that were solved during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 3 generalized the findings to the case of five rule (i.e., checking whether a false product ends in 5 or 0), another procedure for solving and verifying multiplication problems quickly. These results (1) delineate further constraints for inclusion in models of arithmetic processing when thinking about how people select among verification strategies, (2) show combined effects of variables that traditionally have been shown to have separate effects on people’s strategy selection, and (3) are consistent with a view of strategy selection that suggests a bias either in the allocation of cognitive resources in the execution of strategies or in the order of execution of these strategies; they argue against a simple, unbiased competition among strategies.

Defendants who are accused of serious crimes sometimes feign amnesia to evade criminal responsibility. Previous research has suggested that feigning amnesia might impair subsequent recall. In two experiments, participants read and heard a story about a central character, described as “you,” who was responsible for the death of either a puppy (Experiment 1) or a friend (Experiment 2). On free and cued recall tests immediately after the story, participants who had feigned amnesia recalled less than did participants who had recalled accurately. One week later, when all participants recalled accurately, participants who had previously feigned amnesia still performed worse than did participants who had recalled accurately both times. However, the participants who had formerly feigned amnesia did not perform worse than did a control group who had received only the delayed recall tests. Our results suggest that a “feigned amnesia effect” may reflect nothing more than differential practice at recall. Feigning amnesia for a crime need not impair memory for that crime when a person later seeks to remember accurately.

Speakers sometimes encounter utterances that have anomalous linguistic features. Are such features registered during comprehension and transferred to speakers’ production systems? In two experiments, we explored these questions. In a syntactic-priming paradigm, speakers heard prime sentences with novel or intransitive verbs as part of prepositional-dative or double-object structures (e.g., The chef munded the cup to the burglar or The doctor existed the pirate the balloon). Speakers then described target pictures eliciting the same structures, using the same or different novel or intransitive verbs. Speakers overall described targets with the same structures as the primes (abstract syntactic priming), but more so when the primes and targets had the same novel or intransitive verbs (a lexical boost), an effect that was only observed when the novel words served as the verbs in both the prime and target sentences. Such a lexical boost could only manifest if speakers formed associations between the verbs and structures in the primes during comprehension, and if these associations were then transferred to their production systems. We thus showed that anomalous utterance features are not ignored but persist (at least) in speakers’ immediately subsequent production.

The CaR-FA-X model (Williams et al., 2007), or capture and rumination (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), and impaired executive control (X), is a model of overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM). Two mechanisms of the model, rumination and executive control, were examined in isolation and in interaction in order to investigate OGM over time. Across two time points, six months apart, a total of 149 adolescents (13–16 years) completed the minimal-instruction autobiographical memory test, a measure of executive control with both emotional and nonemotional stimuli, and measures of brooding rumination and reflective pondering. The results showed that executive control for emotional information was negatively associated with OGM, but only when reflective pondering levels were high. Therefore, in the context of higher levels of reflective pondering, greater switch costs (i.e., lower executive control) when processing emotional information predicted a decrease in OGM over time.

This paper is concerned with factors that disrupt the pattern of forward reasoning characteristic of experts with accurate performance. Two experiments are described. In the first, the performances of cardiologists, psychiatrists, and surgeons in diagnostic explanation of a clinical problem in cardiology were examined. In the second, the performances of cardiologists and endocrinologists in diagnostic explanation of clinical problems within and outside their domains of expertise were examined. The performances of researchers and practicing physicians are also compared. The results of Experiment 1 replicated earlier results regarding the relationship between forward reasoning and accurate diagnosis. There were no differences in recall as a function of expertise. Experts did not show any bias toward using specific knowledge from their own areas of expertise. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the breakdown of forward reasoning was related to the structure of the task. In particular, nonsalient cues induced some backward reasoning even in subjectswith accurate diagnoses. Some differences were also found between the types of explanation used by researchers and practitioners. The practitioners referred more to clinical components in their explanations, whereas the researchers focused more on the biomedical components.

Subjects studied either an 8- or 16-word list and later recalled the items while a voice key recorded each response latency. The trials were partitioned by recall total in order to examine the means and distributions of both latencies and interresponse times as a function of recall total. Each analysis was consistent with the view that an item’s absolute strength determineswhether it is recalled whereas an item’s relative strength determineswhen it is recalled. In addition, mean latency was effectively proportional to study list length yet independent of recall total. All of the analyses were consistent with the view that the set of study items is sampled according to a relative-strength rule until all items are found and that a sampled item is recovered into consciousness only when its absolute strength exceeds a fixed threshold.