Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy caseSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 30 - Trang 51-93 - 1991
Antoine Billot
The basic purpose of this paper is to link both theorems of impossibility and
existence by introducing fuzzy relations of preference and an exogeneous
requirement, the planner's one, and then proving the fundamental part played by
the extremist agents, leximin and leximax. In other words, to bring out the link
between the planner's requirement and the difficulty of the transition from
individual t... hiện toàn bộ
Hold or roll: reaching the goal in jeopardy race gamesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 76 - Trang 419-450 - 2013
Darryl A. Seale, William E. Stein, Amnon Rapoport
We consider a class of dynamic tournaments in which two contestants are faced
with a choice between two courses of action. The first is a riskless option
(“hold”) of maintaining the resources the contestant already has accumulated in
her turn and ceding the initiative to her rival. The second is the bolder option
(“roll”) of taking the initiative of accumulating additional resources, and
thereby m... hiện toàn bộ
Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stabilitySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 73 - Trang 441-451 - 2011
Ruud Hendrickx, Jacco Thijssen, Peter Borm
This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and
argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come
up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of
spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to
cooperate is properly taken into account.
Reduction, Supervenience, and the Autonomy of Social Scientific LawsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2000
Lee C. McIntyre
Many have felt that it is impossible to defend autonomous laws of social
science: where the regularities upheld are law-like it is argued that they are
not at base social scientific, and where the phenomena to be explained would
seem to require social descriptions, it is argued that laws governing the
phenomena are unavailable at that level. But is it possible to develop an
ontology that supports ... hiện toàn bộ
Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopolySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 83 - Trang 365-383 - 2017
Amparo M. Mármol, Luisa Monroy, M. Ángeles Caraballo, Asunción Zapata
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple
objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single
value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our
approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences
of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of
equilibria in ac... hiện toàn bộ
A refinement of the uncovered set in tournamentsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 86 - Trang 107-121 - 2018
Weibin Han, Adrian Van Deemen
We introduce a new solution for tournaments called the unsurpassed set. This
solution lies between the uncovered set and the Copeland winner set. We show
that this solution is more decisive than the uncovered set in discriminating
among alternatives, and avoids a deficiency of the Copeland winner set.
Moreover, the unsurpassed set is more sensitive than the uncovered set but less
sensitive than th... hiện toàn bộ
An Infinite Decision PuzzleSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - - 1999
Jeffrey A. Barrett, Frank Arntzenius
We tell a story where an agent who chooses in such a way as to make the greatest
possible profit on each of an infinite series of transactions ends up worse off
than an agent who chooses in such a way as to make the least possible profit on
each transaction. That is, contrary to what one might suppose, it is not
necessarily rational always to choose the option that yields the greatest
possible pro... hiện toàn bộ
Reasonable Nash demand gamesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 93 - Trang 319-330 - 2021
Shiran Rachmilevitch
In the Nash demand game (NDG) n players announce utility demands, the demands
are implemented if they are jointly feasible, and otherwise no one gets
anything. If the utilities set is the simplex, the game is called
“divide-the-dollar”. Brams and Taylor (Theory Decis 37:211–231, 1994) studied
variants of divide-the-dollar, on which they imposed reasonableness conditions.
I explore the implications... hiện toàn bộ