Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability
Tóm tắt
This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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