Conditions for Asymmetric Information Solutions when Alliances Provide Acquisition Options and Due DiligenceZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie - Tập 82 - Trang 281-312 - 2004
Richard J. Arend
One main problem with both acquisitions and alliances is separating the attractive partners from the rest. An additional problem with alliances is getting each partner to provide its best assets and efforts. One solution offered for the acquisition adverse selection problem is due diligence through a pre-acquisition alliance; however, none of the papers recommending such an approach analyze the al...... hiện toàn bộ
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price CompetitionZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie - Tập 91 - Trang 263-272 - 2007
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
The endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the private duopoly where firms set prices sequentially, in the mixed duopoly firms choose prices simultaneously. Moreover, the result obtained in the mixed duopoly under price competition differs from the o...... hiện toàn bộ
Taxation and Labor MarketsZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie - Tập 78 - Trang 29-56 - 2003
Pierre M. Picard, Eric Toulemonde
We exploit the common features of models such as union, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used to analyze the effects of any revenue-neutral tax reform on employment. In particular, we show that taxes paid by workers are not equivalent to taxes paid by firms when taxes are non linear. Moreover, we show that the positive impact of tax progressivity on employment i...... hiện toàn bộ
Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuationsZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie - Tập 106 - Trang 83-93 - 2011
Serkan Kucuksenel
We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend ...... hiện toàn bộ
Progression-neutral income tax reforms and horizontal inequityZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie - - 2014
Maria Cubel, Peter J. Lambert
A switch from any given income tax schedule to a tax structure in which two groups of taxpayers are treated differently, each still facing the same degree of progression, can induce an increase in welfare despite causing horizontal inequity (HI). The thrust of much recent research, however, is that removing the HI from an income tax system, by replacing it with a schedule, is itself welfare improv...... hiện toàn bộ