Springer Science and Business Media LLC
ESCI-ISI
2196-1085
2196-1093
Cơ quản chủ quản: Springer Heidelberg
Lĩnh vực:
Economics
Phân tích ảnh hưởng
Các bài báo tiêu biểu
Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
Tập 3 - Trang 65-77 - 2014
Maskin and Riley (Games Econ Behav 45:395–409, 2003) and Lebrun (Games Econ
Behav 55:131–151, 2006) prove that the Bayes–Nash equilibrium of first-price
auctions is unique. This uniqueness requires the assumption that a buyer never
bids above his value (which amounts to the elimination of weakly dominated
strategies). We demonstrate that, in asymmetric first-price auctions (with or
without a minim...
An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction
Tập 6 Số 1 - Trang 15-28 - 2018