Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences

Aggarwal, G., Fiat, A., Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Immorlica, N., Sudan, M.: Derandomization of auctions. In: Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 619-625 (2005)

Alon, N., Feldman, M., Procaccia, A., Tennenholtz, M.: Strategyproof approximation of the minimax on networks. Math. Oper. Res. 35(3), 513–526 (2010)

Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A.: Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21 (1997)

Benassy, J.: The Economics of Market Disequilibrium. Academic Press, San Diego (1982)

Cavallo, R.: Optimal decision making with minimal waste: Strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments. In: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, Hakodate, Japan, pp. 882–889 (2006)

Ching, S.: A simple characterization of the uniform rule. Econ. Lett. 40, 57–60 (1992)

Ching, S.: An alternative characterization of the uniform rule. Soc. Choice Welfare 11, 131–136 (1994)

Chun, Y.: Distribution properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences. Econ. Lett. 67, 23–27 (2000)

Dagan, N.: A note on Thomson’s characterizations of the uniform rule. J. Econ. Theory 69, 255–261 (1996)

Fischer, F., Klimm, M.: Optimal impartial selection. SIAM J. Comput. 44(5), 1263–1285 (2015)

Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Wright, A.: Competitive auctions and digital goods. In: Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Washington, DC, pp. 735-744 (2001)

Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Karlin, A., Saks, M., Wright, A.: Competitive auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 55, 242–269 (2006)

Guo, M., Conitzer, V.: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 67, 69–98 (2009)

Guo, M., Conitzer, V.: Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. Artif. Intell. 174, 363–381 (2010)

Hartline, J., McGrew, R.: From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Vancouver, Canada, pp. 175–182 (2005)

Holmström, B.: Groves’ scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica 47(5), 1137–1144 (1979)

Hurwicz, L.: On informationally decentralized systems. In: McGuire, C., Radner, R. (eds.) Decision and Organization, pp. 297–336. Amsterdam, North-Holland (1972)

Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J.: Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game. Math. Oper. Res. 29(3), 407–435 (2004)

Juarez, R.: The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority vs. average cost. Econ. Theory 34(1), 69–84 (2008)

Juarez, R.: Optimal group strategyproof cost sharing. Mimeo University of Hawaii (2015)

Juarez, R., Kumar, R.: Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks. Econ. Theory 54(2), 359–403 (2013)

Moulin, H.: Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects. J. Econ. Theory 144, 96–119 (2009)

Moulin, H., Shenker, S.: Strategy-proof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency. Econ. Theory 18, 511–533 (2001)

Procaccia, A., Tennenholtz, M.: Approximate Mechanism design without money. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 1(4), Article 18 (2013)

Sönmez, T.: Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule. Econ. Lett. 46, 229–235 (1994)

Sprumont, Y.: The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59(2), 509–519 (1991)

Thomson, W.: Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. Soc. Choice Welfare 11, 205–223 (1994a)

Thomson, W.: Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. J. Econ. Theory 63, 219–245 (1994b)

Thomson, W.: Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. Econ. Theory 5, 229–246 (1995)

Thomson, W.: The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences. J. Econ. Theory 76, 145–168 (1997)

You, J.: Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads. Games Econ. Behav. 92, 166–190 (2015)