Measuring gender segregationSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 8 - Trang 25-47 - 2019
Diego C. Botassio, Rodolfo Hoffmann
This paper aims to fill some gaps in the literature concerning the sensitivity of segregation measures. We examine the definitions of regressive and progressive movement, and formally describe the requirements for these movements. As a result of this analysis, we relax a strong assumption established in the literature regarding these movements. Since these measures increase with regressive movemen...... hiện toàn bộ
Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusionSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 - Trang 255-275 - 2023
Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
We analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder’s bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only an imperfect signal. Whereas leadership with perfect commitment exclusively benefits the follower, imper...... hiện toàn bộ
Comparative risk apportionmentSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 91-112 - 2021
Paan Jindapon, Liqun Liu, William S. Neilson
A decision maker who would rather apportion an independent risk in a state with a good lottery than in a state with a bad lottery is said to have a preference for risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger in Am Econ Rev 96:280–289, 2006). In this paper, we propose a measure for the strength of nth-degree risk apportionment preference based on Pratt’s probability premium (Pratt in Econometrica ...... hiện toàn bộ
The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problemsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 Số 2 - Trang 211-219 - 2023
Antonio Villar
AbstractThis paper proposes and characterizes a method to solve multicriteria evaluation problems when individual judgements are categorical and may fail to satisfy both transitivity and completeness. The evaluation function consists of a weighted sum of the average number of times that each alternative precedes some other, in all pairwise comparisons. It provides,...... hiện toàn bộ
Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferencesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2022
Vincenzo Scalzo
We study exchange economies where the preference relation of each consumer depends also on the consumptions of the other consumers. In the setting of economies with a finite number
$$n\ge 2$$
of consumers and non-ordered and discontinuous preferences, we give sufficient and necessary conditions fo...... hiện toàn bộ
Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determinationSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 - Trang 81-91 - 2023
Arijit Mukherjee
It is well-known that positive output externality on the outside firms is the reason for unprofitable passive cross-holding, which refers to a situation where a producer holds non-controlling shares in rival firms. Considering a final goods market with Cournot duopoly, where cross-holdings do not create positive output externality on the outside firms, we show that cross-holdings can be unprofitab...... hiện toàn bộ
An outside-option-sensitive allocation rule for networks: the kappa-valueSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 1 - Trang 175-188 - 2013
Julia Belau
How should we allocate worth among agents in cooperative models? The literature provides various examples suggesting that an allocation rule should take outside options into account (bargaining power, etc.) as well as the specific position of agents within the network describing the social or economic structure (trade, social networks, etc.). Existing allocation rules lack at least one of these pr...... hiện toàn bộ
Weak maximal elements and weak equilibria in ordinal games with applications to exchange economiesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 6 - Trang 29-39 - 2017
Vincenzo Scalzo
We study binary relations (preferences) and ordinal games in the case where no continuity-like properties are assumed at all. We introduce generalizations of the maximal element and Nash equilibrium, called, respectively, the weak maximal element and weak equilibrium, and give existence results when binary relations satisfy only convexity conditions. The weak maximal element (weak equilibrium) is ...... hiện toàn bộ
Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferencesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 4 - Trang 1-4 - 2015
Philip J. Reny
Reny (Econ Theory, 2015) is used here to prove the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games in which the players’ preferences need be neither complete nor transitive. The proof adapts important ideas from Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2:345–348, 1975).