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Measuring gender segregation
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 8 - Trang 25-47 - 2019
This paper aims to fill some gaps in the literature concerning the sensitivity
of segregation measures. We examine the definitions of regressive and
progressive movement, and formally describe the requirements for these
movements. As a result of this analysis, we relax a strong assumption
established in the literature regarding these movements. Since these measures
increase with regressive movemen...
Correction: The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 - Trang 221-221 - 2023
Comparative risk apportionment
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 91-112 - 2021
A decision maker who would rather apportion an independent risk in a state with
a good lottery than in a state with a bad lottery is said to have a preference
for risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger in Am Econ Rev 96:280–289,
2006). In this paper, we propose a measure for the strength of nth-degree risk
apportionment preference based on Pratt’s probability premium (Pratt in
Econometrica ...
The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 Số 2 - Trang 211-219 - 2023
AbstractThis paper proposes and characterizes a method to solve multicriteria
evaluation problems when individual judgements are categorical and may fail to
satisfy both transitivity and completeness. The evaluation function consists of
a weighted sum of the average number of times that each alternative precedes
some other, in all pairwise comparisons. It provides, therefore, a quantitative
assess...
Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2022
We study exchange economies where the preference relation of each consumer
depends also on the consumptions of the other consumers. In the setting of
economies with a finite number $$n\ge 2$$ of consumers and non-ordered and
discontinuous preferences, we give sufficient and necessary conditions for the
existence of alpha-core allocations in the sense of Yannelis (Equilibrium theory
in infinite dim...
Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 - Trang 81-91 - 2023
It is well-known that positive output externality on the outside firms is the
reason for unprofitable passive cross-holding, which refers to a situation where
a producer holds non-controlling shares in rival firms. Considering a final
goods market with Cournot duopoly, where cross-holdings do not create positive
output externality on the outside firms, we show that cross-holdings can be
unprofitab...
An outside-option-sensitive allocation rule for networks: the kappa-value
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 1 - Trang 175-188 - 2013
How should we allocate worth among agents in cooperative models? The literature
provides various examples suggesting that an allocation rule should take outside
options into account (bargaining power, etc.) as well as the specific position
of agents within the network describing the social or economic structure (trade,
social networks, etc.). Existing allocation rules lack at least one of these
pr...
Weak maximal elements and weak equilibria in ordinal games with applications to exchange economies
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 6 - Trang 29-39 - 2017
We study binary relations (preferences) and ordinal games in the case where no
continuity-like properties are assumed at all. We introduce generalizations of
the maximal element and Nash equilibrium, called, respectively, the weak maximal
element and weak equilibrium, and give existence results when binary relations
satisfy only convexity conditions. The weak maximal element (weak equilibrium)
is ...
Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 4 - Trang 1-4 - 2015
Reny (Econ Theory, 2015) is used here to prove the existence of equilibrium in
discontinuous games in which the players’ preferences need be neither complete
nor transitive. The proof adapts important ideas from Shafer and Sonnenschein (J
Math Econ 2:345–348, 1975).
Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2023
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