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Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 4 - Trang 1-4 - 2015
Philip J. Reny
Reny (Econ Theory, 2015) is used here to prove the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games in which the players’ preferences need be neither complete nor transitive. The proof adapts important ideas from Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2:345–348, 1975).
On the continuity of the feasible set mapping in optimal transport
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 113-117 - 2021
Mario Ghossoub, David Saunders
Consider the set of probability measures with given marginal distributions on the product of two complete, separable metric spaces, seen as a correspondence when the marginal distributions vary. Bergin (Econ Theory 13: 471–481, 1999) established the continuity of this correspondence, and in this note, we present a novel and considerably shorter proof of this important result.
Two characterizations of the random arrival rule
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 3 - Trang 43-52 - 2015
Yan-An Hwang
The main focus of this note is on the random arrival rule. We adopt two characterizations from transferable utility games theory and reinterpret them in the framework of bankruptcy problems. One is that the random arrival rule can be formulated as the vector of marginal compensations of a potential function. The other one is that the random arrival rule is the only rule satisfying balanced compens...... hiện toàn bộ
First-price auctions on general preference domains: axiomatic characterizations
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 1 - Trang 93-103 - 2013
Tsuyoshi Adachi, Takumi Kongo
In a single-item auction with agents having general preferences, first-price auctions are axiomatically characterized. In this study, we characterize first-price auctions by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, anonymity in welfare, and non-bossiness in welfare. The first three properties are satisfied by second-price auctions. Considering the well-known fact that second-price auctions are s...... hiện toàn bộ
Cạnh tranh với sự tương đồng về giá Dịch bởi AI
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 4 - Trang 277-290 - 2015
Benjamin Bachi
Một thị trường duopoly được phân tích, trong đó các công ty cạnh tranh về giá đối với người tiêu dùng, những người chỉ phản ứng trước những khác biệt giá cả lớn. Khi giá cả gần như tương đương, người tiêu dùng sẽ ngẫu nhiên lựa chọn. Bài báo chỉ ra rằng thị trường có một điểm cân bằng với hỗ trợ có giới hạn nếu, và chỉ nếu, độ nhạy của người tiêu dùng đối với sự khác biệt giá cả đủ cao. Nếu tồn tạ...... hiện toàn bộ
#thị trường duopoly #cạnh tranh giá cả #độ nhạy giá #lợi nhuận công ty #cân bằng thị trường
Designing income distributions with specified inequalities
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 297-311 - 2021
Satya R. Chakravarty, Palash Sarkar
Often from policy perspective it becomes necessary to arrive at an income distribution whose inequality value coincides with a targeted (low) inequality level. In the present article we address this duality problem in inequality measurement by using the well-known Gini and Bonferroni metrics of inequality. The duality theorem also enables us to determine the financial cost of achieving the targete...... hiện toàn bộ
An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 6 Số 1 - Trang 15-28 - 2018
Dionysius Glycopantis, Charitini Stavropoulou
Measuring gender segregation
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 8 - Trang 25-47 - 2019
Diego C. Botassio, Rodolfo Hoffmann
This paper aims to fill some gaps in the literature concerning the sensitivity of segregation measures. We examine the definitions of regressive and progressive movement, and formally describe the requirements for these movements. As a result of this analysis, we relax a strong assumption established in the literature regarding these movements. Since these measures increase with regressive movemen...... hiện toàn bộ
Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 - Trang 255-275 - 2023
Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
We analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder’s bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only an imperfect signal. Whereas leadership with perfect commitment exclusively benefits the follower, imper...... hiện toàn bộ
Comparative risk apportionment
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 91-112 - 2021
Paan Jindapon, Liqun Liu, William S. Neilson
A decision maker who would rather apportion an independent risk in a state with a good lottery than in a state with a bad lottery is said to have a preference for risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger in Am Econ Rev 96:280–289, 2006). In this paper, we propose a measure for the strength of nth-degree risk apportionment preference based on Pratt’s probability premium (Pratt in Econometrica ...... hiện toàn bộ
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