Extending tournament solutionsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 51 - Trang 193-222 - 2018
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein
An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a ric...... hiện toàn bộ
The power of a cohesive subgroup within a voting bodySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 2 - Trang 197-206 - 1985
P. C. Fishburn, W. V. Gehrlein
We examine the power of a subgroup within a voting body as a function of its size and cohesiveness. The measure of cohesiveness is the probability that an arbitrary member of the subgroup will vote the same way as the leader of the subgroup. All voters are assumed to vote independently, and those not in the subgroup vote “for” or “against” with probability 1/2 in each case. The power of the subgro...... hiện toàn bộ
Measuring and implementing equality of opportunity for incomeSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2004
Vito Peragine
Departing from the welfarist tradition, recent theories of justice focus on individual opportunities as the appropriate standard for distributive judgments. To explore how this philosophical conception can be translated into concrete public policy, we select the income as relevant outcome and the income tax as the relevant redistributive policy, and we address the following questions: (i) what is ...... hiện toàn bộ
Stabbed in the back? Mandated political representation and murdersSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 56 - Trang 595-634 - 2020
Victoire Girard
This paper provides the first country-wide research evidence that an affirmative action policy may induce a backlash. I exploit the timing of the implementation of caste-based electoral quotas across and within the states of India. The results show that the implementation of the electoral quotas coincides with an increase in the number of murders targeting members of the lower castes. The analysis...... hiện toàn bộ
On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse resultSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 20 - Trang 77-83 - 2003
Koji Takamiya
In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result...... hiện toàn bộ
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objectsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 60 - Trang 103-120 - 2021
Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objec...... hiện toàn bộ
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains resultsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 49 - Trang 357-385 - 2017
Takuma Wakayama
This paper considers the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents. We are interested in rules eliminating the possibility that an agent can compensate another to misrepresent her preferences, making both agents strictly better off. Such rules are said to be bribe-proof (Schummer in J Econ Theory 91:180–198, 2000). We first provide necessary and sufficient cond...... hiện toàn bộ