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Extending tournament solutions
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 51 - Trang 193-222 - 2018
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein
An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a ric...... hiện toàn bộ
An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 1 Số 2 - Trang 113-122 - 1984
Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Bezalel Peleg
On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 20 - Trang 77-83 - 2003
Koji Takamiya
In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result...... hiện toàn bộ
Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 35 Số 1 - Trang 29-48 - 2010
Manipushpak Mitra, Arunava Sen
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 49 - Trang 357-385 - 2017
Takuma Wakayama
This paper considers the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents. We are interested in rules eliminating the possibility that an agent can compensate another to misrepresent her preferences, making both agents strictly better off. Such rules are said to be bribe-proof (Schummer in J Econ Theory 91:180–198, 2000). We first provide necessary and sufficient cond...... hiện toàn bộ
Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2019
Shiran Rachmilevitch
Reconciling normative and behavioural economics: the problems to be solved
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2012
Ben McQuillin, Robert Sugden
Measuring freedom of choice: An alternative view of a recent literature
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 22 - Trang 29-48 - 2004
Sebastiano Bavetta
A recent literature has emerged in social choice theory which attributes intrinsic importance to freedom in the evaluation of states of affairs. The literature’s philosophical basis lies in Berlin’s notion of positive liberty. Accordingly, axiomatic measures of availability of choices are developed and the information they convey used for ranking states on the basis of the extent of liberty they o...... hiện toàn bộ
The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 31 - Trang 621-640 - 2008
Masahiro Kumabe, H. Reiju Mihara
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater ...... hiện toàn bộ
Optimal taxation in the presence of income-dependent relative income effects
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 51 Số 2 - Trang 313-335 - 2018
Donald Bruce, Langchuan Peng
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