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Extending tournament solutions
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 51 - Trang 193-222 - 2018
An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1)
functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between
alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number
of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and
complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments
have a ric...
The power of a cohesive subgroup within a voting body
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 2 - Trang 197-206 - 1985
We examine the power of a subgroup within a voting body as a function of its
size and cohesiveness. The measure of cohesiveness is the probability that an
arbitrary member of the subgroup will vote the same way as the leader of the
subgroup. All voters are assumed to vote independently, and those not in the
subgroup vote “for” or “against” with probability 1/2 in each case. The power of
the subgro...
An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 1 Số 2 - Trang 113-122 - 1984
Measuring and implementing equality of opportunity for income
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - - 2004
Departing from the welfarist tradition, recent theories of justice focus on
individual opportunities as the appropriate standard for distributive judgments.
To explore how this philosophical conception can be translated into concrete
public policy, we select the income as relevant outcome and the income tax as
the relevant redistributive policy, and we address the following questions: (i)
what is ...
Subgroup deliberation and voting
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 45 - Trang 155-186 - 2015
We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in heterogeneous
committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting and voting preceded by
either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the first deliberation protocol
imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous
subgroups. We find that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes
achieved u...
Stabbed in the back? Mandated political representation and murders
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 56 - Trang 595-634 - 2020
This paper provides the first country-wide research evidence that an affirmative
action policy may induce a backlash. I exploit the timing of the implementation
of caste-based electoral quotas across and within the states of India. The
results show that the implementation of the electoral quotas coincides with an
increase in the number of murders targeting members of the lower castes. The
analysis...
On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 20 - Trang 77-83 - 2003
In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established
that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an
allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal,
then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core
correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the
converse claim of this result....
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 60 - Trang 103-120 - 2021
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where
each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation
mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment
of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J
Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents
and objec...
Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 35 Số 1 - Trang 29-48 - 2010
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 49 - Trang 357-385 - 2017
This paper considers the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly
divisible resource among agents. We are interested in rules eliminating the
possibility that an agent can compensate another to misrepresent her
preferences, making both agents strictly better off. Such rules are said to be
bribe-proof (Schummer in J Econ Theory 91:180–198, 2000). We first provide
necessary and sufficient cond...
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