Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Tóm tắt
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Alkan A, Gale D (1990) The core of the matching game. Games Econ Behav 2:203–212
Baisa B (2020) Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods. Theor Econ 15:361–423
Demange G, Gale D (1985) The strategy structure of two-sided matching markets. Econometrica 53:873–888
Kazumura T, Mishra D, Serizawa S (2020a) Mechanism design without quasilinearity. Theor Econ 15:511–544
Kazumura T, Mishra D, Serizawa S (2020b) Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. J Econ Theory 188:105036
Kazumura T, Serizawa S (2016) Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences. Soc Choice Welf 47:633–663
Malik M, Mishra D (2021) Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilineality. J Econ Theory 191:105128
Morimoto S, Serizawa S (2015) Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule. Theor Econ 10:445–487
Saitoh H, Serizawa S (2008) Vickrey allocation rule with income effect. Econ Theory 35:391–401
Sakai T (2008) Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterization. Econ Theory 37:347–356
Shinozaki H, Kazumura T, Serizawa S (2020) Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation with money: (Non)decreasing marginal valuations without quasi-linearity. ISER Discussion Paper, No. 1097
Zhou Y, Serizawa S (2018) Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi- linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule. Game Econ Behav 109:327–363