Journal of Financial Services Research

Credit unions are cooperative financial institutions that typically operate on a one-member/one-vote governance rule. This paper demonstrates that such a governance rule may enhance the survival of such organizational forms in the face of adverse incentives created by accumulated financial surpluses and identifies factors that may prompt conversion to a joint-stock form. The analysis is based on noting that current members collectively have “inherited” accumulated surpluses of the cooperative from past members. Older members have an incentive to extract maximum personal private benefit from that inheritance by voting to convert from a cooperative to a joint stock company, even though such an outcome may be socially suboptimal. A simple overlapping generations model is used to develop a “sustainability constraint,” which must be met if conversion is not to occur and examine how a one-member/one-vote governance rule contributes to the survival of the institution in a cooperative form.

The Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 12b-1 ended a 40-year prohibition on the payment of distribution fees by mutual funds. The fees have the potential to create conflicts between fund managers and shareholders. This study examines the characteristics of funds implementing the plans, and assesses costs and benefits. Findings reveal that there is a growing tendency of funds, particularly load funds, to adopt the plans. The costs have begun to increase dramatically in recent years though some load funds with plans have begun reducing their loads. However, 12b-1 plans do not seem to contribute to the expense ratios of funds oriented toward capital gains. The plans offer the intangible benefit of spreading load charges across time, thus increasing a fund's attractiveness to a broader range of investors.