Journal of Financial Services Research

The recent financial crisis highlights the importance of both regulatory and market discipline. Government reactions to the crisis included expanding deposit insurance coverage and rescuing troubled institutions, including some institutions that might not otherwise be considered too important to fail. These actions may have the unintended consequence of a reduction in market discipline that might otherwise penalize banks for risk-taking behavior. Alternatively, market discipline may have increased during the crisis due to heightened awareness of the risks of bank failures. To address these issues, we first test for the presence of depositor discipline effects in the period leading up to the financial crisis in both the US and the EU. Second, we test whether depositor discipline decreased or increased during the crisis. We find significant depositor discipline prior to the crisis in both the US and EU, but this varies between the US and the EU as well as with banking organization size and with listed versus unlisted status. We also find that depositor discipline mostly decreased during the crisis, except for the case of small US banks.

A signalling model is presented that provides an additional explanation for the determination of call premia on corporate bonds. It is shown that firms may signal their exclusive information about their probability of default by the choice of their call premia. Stockholders of safer firms (i.e., those that have a lower probability of bankruptcy) have a higher incentive for providing a low call premium. This occurs because the call option will be valuable only if the firm survives by the first call date. This event, however, is more likely for the safer firm. The safer firm will therefore be more willing to sacrifice some current revenues (or equivalently, to provide a higher coupon than it would otherwise have to pay in order to sell the bond at par) by determining a lower call premium. The model therefore predicts a negative correlation between safety and call premia, a correlation that has been empirically confirmed by Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). This correlation provides support to the signalling theory vis-à-vis the alternative explanation of taxes determining the call premia. Another contribution of this model is that it ties the call premium decision with expectations of future interest rates. Such expectations are considered important by practitioners, but were rarely considered in previous research.

We empirically investigate depositors’ response to various bank risk measures under different deposit insurance regimes. We find that depositor discipline is most significant during periods of full insurance coverage rather than during limited insurance coverage, and that deposit withdrawal induces bank managers to carry out aggressive restructuring. Our evidence suggests that the magnitude of depositor discipline is affected by both the extent of insurance coverage, and by the degree of public confidence in the stability of the financial system and the extent of regulatory forbearance. There is little evidence that higher interest rates at riskier banks promote depositor discipline.

The October 1987 stock market crash spawned an abundance of research papers, as scholars attempted to explain what seemed at the time, and to some extent remains, an inexplicable event. Except for the period immediately around the crash, there is only meager evidence that international linkages across markets have become tighter over time. Yet the crash was worldwide in scope, and its similarity across countries was uncanny. Just on the face, this international similarity puts doubt to such explanations as particular macroeconomic events in one country, failure of a given country's market system, or simultaneous changes in underlying fundamentals (which were quite different across countries). Assigning the origination of the crash to one country cannot be entirely ruled out, however, because of the possibility of a non-fully revealing equilibrium “contagion” process of the type suggested by King and Wadhwani (1988). Such a process would allow a world-wide crash to begin by a particular news event or even by a market “mistake” in one country. Evidence in favor of this process is that international correlations of returns increased dramatically during the crash period. However, this increase is consistent with other explanations, such as transaction costs hindering international arbitrage except during periods of high volatility. Was the crash the bursting of a bubble? Some evidence seems to support this proposition: for example, in the majority of countries, the pre-crash period displayed significant serial dependence in stock returns, dependence that was definitely not present in the post-crash period. However, further work is necessary to ascertain whether this measured serial dependence is unusual relative to what one would have expected to find, even in a perfectly random process, by choosing a sample period that happened to culminate in a random peak. Ross (1987) shows that such ex post sample period selection will induce upward bias in estimates of serial dependence. Cross-country tests failed to detect this bias, but there are several ambiguities in the tests that will have to be resolved in future work. The crash is history. What implications, if any, does it have for regulatory policy? Is there evidence that popular regulations or rules would have mitigated the crash, or that they would decrease price volatility in general? There is very little evidence in favor of the efficacity of margin requirements, price limits, or transactions taxes. Despite a large number of empirical studies, no one has provided evidence that margin requirements have an impact on volatility. There has been at least one recent paper claiming the contrary, but a careful examination of its methods have uncovered enough problems to cast those results into doubt. As for price limits, there must be a very short-term impact on measured volatility, for the measured market price at a trading halt is likely to understate the direction of movement. Yet even for daily data, the cross-country evidence is slim that price limits reduce volatility, and there is no evidence at all that they work over periods as long as a week. In other words, trading halts caused by limits seem to have no effect on true volatility. Transaction taxes are inversely but insignificantly correlated with volatility across countries, and the effect is too questionable for taxes to be used with confidence as an effective policy instrument.

Returns to bidders are examined for 108 bank acquisitions over the 1981–1987 period. These returns provide evidence on the conflict-of-interest hypothesis and the hubris hypothesis, both of which predict negative returns to bidders, versus the shareholder wealth maximization model that predicts positive (or at least non-negative) returns. Further evidence on these hypotheses is provided from the returns on 18 defensive acquisitions. Consistent with the conflict-of-interest and hubris hypotheses, announcement period returns are negative and statistically significant both for interstate and intrastate acquisitions. However, bidder returns to interstate bank acquisitions do not differ significantly from intrastate mergers.

Using data for 91 large banks from 45 countries, this paper finds that foreign, domestic private, and government-owned banks use different lending technologies and organizational structures for SME financing. The extent, type, and pricing of SME loans, however, is not strongly correlated with lending technologies and organizational structures, suggesting that SME financing need not be based only on “relationship lending”. Consistent with these results, we find few significant differences in the extent, type, and pricing of SME loans across bank types. Instead, we find significant differences across developed and developing countries, driven by differences in the institutional and legal environment.

This paper uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. It finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. The analysis does not find that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for extensive coverage.

Supra-governmental regulatory institutions (SNRs) resemble bridges that span gaps in the jurisdiction of individual–country regulators. The most important bridges address cross-country problems of crisis management and development finance not just as forums but as portfolio lenders as well. At portfolio SNRs, traditional cash-flow accounting supports incentives to overlend to countries undergoing crisis and to direct insufficient development funds to the world's neediest countries. Better performance requires not so much a structural streamlining of SNR missions as a realignment of the bureaucratic incentive systems under which SNR managers function. To accomplish this, reformers must focus on identifying economically meaningful indexes of SNR achievement and experimenting with programs that link deferred managerial compensation at SNRs to sustained long-period movements in the selected indexes.