How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?
Tóm tắt
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Acharya V, Yorulmazer T (2007) Too many to fail – an analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies. J Financ Intermediation 16:1–31
Angbazo L, Saunders A (1997) “The effect of TBTF deregulation on bank cost of funds,” Wharton Financial Institutions Center: Working Paper 97–25
Benston G, Hunter WC, Wall L (1995) Motivations for bank mergers and acquisitions: enhancing the deposit insurance put option versus earnings diversification. J Money Credit Bank 27:777–788
Bernanke B (2010) “Causes of the recent financial and economic crisis,” Speech before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Washington, D.C., September 2
Blinder A (2009) “It’s broke, let’s fix it: rethinking financial regulation,” Working paper: Princeton University, presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference, October 23
Boyd J, Gertler M (1994) “The role of large banks in the recent U.S. banking crisis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Winter), 319–368
Bradley M, Desai A, Kim EH (1988) Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. J Financ Econ 21:3–40
Brewer E, Jackson W, Jagtiani J (2010) Corporate Governance Structure and Mergers, Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia WP# 10-26
Brewer E, Jackson W, Jagtiani J, Nguyen T (2000) Bank Mergers in the 1990s. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economics Perspectives (March), 2-23
Brickley J, James C (1986) Access to deposit insurance, insolvency rules and the stock returns of financial institutions. J Financ Econ 16:345–371
Brown C, Dinc IS (2009) Too many to fail? Evidence of regulatory forbearance when the banking sector is weak. MIT-Sloan Working Paper, February 7
Bruni F, Paterno F (1995) Market discipline of banks’ riskiness: a study of selected issues. J Financ Serv Res 9:303–325
Carow K, Kane E, Narayanan R (2006) How have borrowers fared in banking megamergers? J Money Credit Bank 38:821–836
DeLong G, DeYoung R (2007) Learning by observing: information spillovers in the execution and valuation of commercial bank M&As. J Finance 62:181–217
DeYoung R, Evanoff D, Molyneux P (2009) Mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions: a review of the post-2000 literature. J Financ Serv Res 36:87–110
Ennis HM, Malek HS (2005) Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 91:21–44
Flannery M (2000) Modernizing financial regulation: the relation between interbank transactions and supervisory reform. J Financ Serv Res 17:101–116
Flannery M, Sorescu SM (1996) Evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields: 1983–1991. J Finance 51:1347–1377
Greenspan A (2001) “The financial safety net, Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,” May 2001, 1–8
Hasan K (1992) The market’s perception of the riskiness of large U.S. bank commercial letters of credit. J Financ Serv Res 6:207–221
Hoenig T (1999) Financial industry megamergers and policy challenges, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Econ Rev 84:7–13
Houston J, James C, Ryngaert M (2001) Where do merger gains come from? bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders. J Financ Econ 60:285–331
Kane E (2000) Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-study evidence? J Money Credit Bank 32:671–701
Kane E (2009) Extracting nontransparent safety net subsidies by strategically expanding and contracting a financial institution’s accounting balance sheet. J Financ Serv Res 36:161–168
Kaufman G (1990) “Are Some Banks Too Large to Fail? Myth and Reality.” Contemporary Policy Issues, October 1990, pp 1–14
Kaufman G (1991a) “Too Large to Fail, Too Costly to Continue.” Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report, Spring
Kaufman G (2002) “Too big to fail in banking: what remains.” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (Summer):423–436
Kwast M, Passmore W (2000) The subsidy provided by the federal safety net: theory and evidence. J Financ Serv Res 17:125–145
Macey J (2008) “Brave new fed – a commentary by Jonathan Macey,” Yale Law School: Commentary, March 31
Morgan D, Stiroh K (2005) “Too big to fail after all these years,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 220 (September)
O’Hara M, Shaw W (1990) Deposit insurance and wealth effects: the value of being too big to fail. J Finance 45:1587–1600
Penas MF, Unal H (2004) Gains in bank mergers: evidence from the bond markets. J Financ Econ 74:140–179
Plosser CI (2008) “Financial econometrics, financial innovation, and financial stability,” For the Inaugural Conference of the Society for Financial Econometrics, New York University Stern School of Business, New York, NY, June 5
Rime B (2005) “Do too-big-to-fail expectations boost large banks’ issuer ratings?” Swiss National Banks, Systemic Stability Section: Working Paper (May 9)
Rosengren E (2000) Modernizing financial regulation: implications for bank supervision. J Financ Serv Res 17:117–123
Schmid MM, Walter I (2006) “Do financial conglomerates create or destroy economic value?” Working Paper, New York University Stern School of Business, September
Stern G (2009a) “Addressing the too-big-to-fail problem,” Statement presented before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., May 6
Stern G (2009b) “Better late than never: addressing too-big-to-fail,” Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 31
Stern G, Feldman R (2004) Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C
Stern G, Feldman R (2009) “Addressing TBTF by Shrinking financial institutions: an initial assessment,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis: The Region, June, 8–13
White H (1980) A heteroscadasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroscadasticity. Econometrica 48:203–223