Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
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Sắp xếp:
Attachment insecurity and perceived partner suffering as predictors of personal distress
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 46 - Trang 1143-1147 - 2010
Liking and the attribution process
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 10 - Trang 385-397 - 1974
Personality and Nonverbal Social Behavior: An Ethological Perspective of Relationship Initiation
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 29 - Trang 434-461 - 1993
How perceptions of one's organization can affect perceptions of the self: Membership in a stable organization can sustain individuals' sense of control
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 76 - Trang 104-115 - 2018
Differential information use for near and distant decisions
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 46 - Trang 638-642 - 2010
Dominance biases in the perception and memory for the faces of powerholders, with consequences for social inferences
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 78 - Trang 23-33 - 2018
Responses to Other-Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 37 - Trang 486-501 - 2001
When my wrongs are worse than yours: Behavioral and neural asymmetries in first-person and third-person perspectives of accidental harms
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 94 - Trang 104102 - 2021
Research on third-party moral judgments highlights two mechanisms as central to moral judgments of accidental harms: the inference of intent and the perception of harm. However, little is known about how these mechanisms are recruited when people evaluate themselves for harm that they have accidentally caused. Here we explore how a person's perspective — as either actor or observer — influences their moral judgments of accidental harm. We use fMRI to investigate how brain regions involved in the inference of intent and the perception of harm differentially respond when participants either cause (first-person) or observe (third-person) accidental harm. First, we find that people judge their own accidental harms more harshly than they judge others' accidents, and hold themselves more responsible for the unintended harmful outcomes of their choices. Second, we find that regions responding to the first-hand experience of pain are also more sensitive to first-person harms relative to third-person harms, and brain-behavior relationships in a subset of these regions suggest that the tendency to judge oneself more harshly may be supported by a greater sensitivity to the victim's experience of harm. Third, though we find that first-person harms recruit regions for mental state inference to a lesser extent than third-person harms, this difference does not appear to account for the behavioral differences in moral judgment between first-person and third-person harms. The results of this experiment suggest that accidental harms are an important context for broadening our understanding of the relationship between agency, empathy, and moral judgments about the self.
#Morality #Accident #Agency #Harm #Theory of mind #fMRI
Appreciating art verbally: Verbalization can make a work of art be both undeservedly loved and unjustly maligned
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 45 - Trang 1140-1143 - 2009
Evidence that dissonance arousal is initially undifferentiated and only later labeled as negative
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology - Tập 49 - Trang 767-770 - 2013
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