Multisided matching games with complementaritiesInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 28 - Trang 489-509 - 1999
Katerina Sherstyuk
The paper considers multisided matching games with transfereable utility using the approach of cooperative game theory. Stable matchings are shown to exist when characteristic functions are supermodular, i.e., agents' abilities to contribute to the value of a coalition are complementary across types. We analyze the structure of the core of supermodular matching games and suggest an algorithm for ...... hiện toàn bộ
The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problemsInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 39 - Trang 137-150 - 2009
Carmen Herrero, Antonio Villar
The purpose of this paper is to extend the rights egalitarian solution (Herrero et al. in Math Soc Sci 37:59–77, 1999) to the context of non-transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One is the “proportional solution”, that corresponds to the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for...... hiện toàn bộ
Stay-in-a-set gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory - - 2002
Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth
Proportional pie-cuttingInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 36 - Trang 353-367 - 2007
Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler
David Gale (Math Intell 15:48–52, 1993) was perhaps the first to suggest that there is a difference between cake and pie cutting. A cake can be viewed as a rectangle valued along its horizontal axis, and a pie as a disk valued along its circumference. We will use vertical, parallel cuts to divide a cake into pieces, and radial cuts from the center to divide a pie into wedge-shaped pieces. We restr...... hiện toàn bộ
Control costs and potential functions for spatial gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 31 - Trang 541-561 - 2003
Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, Philippe Solal
Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games played on quasi-symmetric weighted graphs and explore the properties of the ensuing Markov chain.
Symmetry and p -StabilityInternational Journal of Game Theory - - 2004
Srihari Govindan, Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel
The generalized Nash bargaining solution and Incentive Compatible MechanismsInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 21 - Trang 109-129 - 1992
F. Weidner
In this paper I analyze whether the generalized Nash solution which has been defined by Harsanyi and Selten for bargaining problems with incomplete information can be characterized in the mechanism framework introduced by Myerson. I show that the solution is uniquely determined by a set of axioms in the case of independently distributed types. It can be seen that the axioms given by Harsanyi and S...... hiện toàn bộ
A note on efficient signaling of bargaining powerInternational Journal of Game Theory - - 2000
Mehmet Bac
Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the “strong” type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues...... hiện toàn bộ
Cân bằng Nash chiến lược thuần túy cho các mô hình thương lượng lựa chọn tập thể Dịch bởi AI International Journal of Game Theory - - Trang 1-49 - 2023
Malte Braack, Christian Henning, Johannes Ziesmer
Bài báo này xem xét các cân bằng Nash chiến lược thuần túy của các mô hình thương lượng lập pháp không hợp tác. Trái ngược với các mô hình thương lượng lập pháp hiện có, chúng tôi suy diễn hành vi của các nhà lập pháp từ việc tối đa hóa tiện ích ngẫu nhiên. Cách tiếp cận này cho phép chúng tôi chứng minh sự tồn tại của một Cân bằng Nash thuần túy địa phương và toàn cầu tại thời điểm tĩnh trong các...... hiện toàn bộ
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