Multisided matching games with complementaritiesInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 28 - Trang 489-509 - 1999
Katerina Sherstyuk
The paper considers multisided matching games with transfereable utility using
the approach of cooperative game theory. Stable matchings are shown to exist
when characteristic functions are supermodular, i.e., agents' abilities to
contribute to the value of a coalition are complementary across types. We
analyze the structure of the core of supermodular matching games and suggest an
algorithm for c... hiện toàn bộ
The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problemsInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 39 - Trang 137-150 - 2009
Carmen Herrero, Antonio Villar
The purpose of this paper is to extend the rights egalitarian solution (Herrero
et al. in Math Soc Sci 37:59–77, 1999) to the context of non-transferable
utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind
of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One
is the “proportional solution”, that corresponds to the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution for... hiện toàn bộ
Stay-in-a-set gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory - - 2002
Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth
Proportional pie-cuttingInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 36 - Trang 353-367 - 2007
Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler
David Gale (Math Intell 15:48–52, 1993) was perhaps the first to suggest that
there is a difference between cake and pie cutting. A cake can be viewed as a
rectangle valued along its horizontal axis, and a pie as a disk valued along its
circumference. We will use vertical, parallel cuts to divide a cake into pieces,
and radial cuts from the center to divide a pie into wedge-shaped pieces. We
restr... hiện toàn bộ
Control costs and potential functions for spatial gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 31 - Trang 541-561 - 2003
Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, Philippe Solal
Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously
determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can
control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their
methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games played on
quasi-symmetric weighted graphs and explore the properties of the ensuing Markov
chain.
Symmetry and p -StabilityInternational Journal of Game Theory - - 2004
Srihari Govindan, Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel
The generalized Nash bargaining solution and Incentive Compatible MechanismsInternational Journal of Game Theory - Tập 21 - Trang 109-129 - 1992
F. Weidner
In this paper I analyze whether the generalized Nash solution which has been
defined by Harsanyi and Selten for bargaining problems with incomplete
information can be characterized in the mechanism framework introduced by
Myerson. I show that the solution is uniquely determined by a set of axioms in
the case of independently distributed types. It can be seen that the axioms
given by Harsanyi and S... hiện toàn bộ
A note on efficient signaling of bargaining powerInternational Journal of Game Theory - - 2000
Mehmet Bac
Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining
power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both
modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the “strong” type of the
informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the
whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when
the issues ... hiện toàn bộ
Cân bằng Nash chiến lược thuần túy cho các mô hình thương lượng lựa chọn tập thể Dịch bởi AI International Journal of Game Theory - - Trang 1-49 - 2023
Malte Braack, Christian Henning, Johannes Ziesmer
Bài báo này xem xét các cân bằng Nash chiến lược thuần túy của các mô hình
thương lượng lập pháp không hợp tác. Trái ngược với các mô hình thương lượng lập
pháp hiện có, chúng tôi suy diễn hành vi của các nhà lập pháp từ việc tối đa hóa
tiện ích ngẫu nhiên. Cách tiếp cận này cho phép chúng tôi chứng minh sự tồn tại
của một Cân bằng Nash thuần túy địa phương và toàn cầu tại thời điểm tĩnh trong
các... hiện toàn bộ
#Cân bằng Nash #chiến lược thuần túy #thương lượng lập pháp #tối ưu Pareto #Định lý Voter Trung Bình