International Journal of Game Theory
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Multisided matching games with complementarities
International Journal of Game Theory - Tập 28 - Trang 489-509 - 1999
The paper considers multisided matching games with transfereable utility using the approach of cooperative game theory. Stable matchings are shown to exist when characteristic functions are supermodular, i.e., agents' abilities to contribute to the value of a coalition are complementary across types. We analyze the structure of the core of supermodular matching games and suggest an algorithm for ......
Control costs and potential functions for spatial games
International Journal of Game Theory - Tập 31 - Trang 541-561 - 2003
Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games played on quasi-symmetric weighted graphs and explore the properties of the ensuing Markov chain.
A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
International Journal of Game Theory - - 2000
Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the “strong” type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues......
A dynamic approach to the Shapley value based on associated games
International Journal of Game Theory - Tập 33 - Trang 551-562 - 2005
We propose a dynamic process leading to the Shapley value of TU games or any solution satisfying Inessential Game (IG) and Continuity (CONT), based on a modified version of Hamiache's notion of an associated game.
Deterrence games and the disruption of information
International Journal of Game Theory - - Trang 1-27 - 2023
Deterrence is a generic situation where a “Retaliator” (Player R) threatens to bash an “Underminer” (Player U) should he take a stealth threatening move. A typical Underminer is a potential bomb builder, market invader or computer hacker. The Retaliator’s decision whether to bash will depend on a noisy signal her intelligence receives about U’s action. U may or may not have the ability to disrupt ......
Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture
International Journal of Game Theory - Tập 47 Số 3 - Trang 893-912 - 2018
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
International Journal of Game Theory - - 2002
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