International Journal of Game Theory

This paper studies a Bayesian persuasion game in which a receiver can receive signals from two senders. We study under what circumstances the competition between senders induces them to fully disclose all of the signals available. We find that if the senders’ preferences are such that they are opposite to the same degree across states (to be made precise in the paper), full disclosure is the only equilibrium outcome of the game. Furthermore, we find that the above condition on the senders’ preferences is also necessary if we require that full disclosure be the only equilibrium outcome for any receiver’s utility and any information environment.

We study a variation of Hotelling’s location model in which consumers choose between firms based on travel distances as well as the number of consumers visiting each firm. The model in which the network externality is the same for all firms was proposed by Kohlberg (Econ Lett 11:211–216, 1983), who claims that no equilibrium exists for more than two firms. We assume the network effects to be linear and, in contrast to the claim in Kohlberg (Econ Lett 11:211–216, 1983), derive a condition under which a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists for four and six firms. Moreover, we show that for more than two firms the equilibrium locations of the firms are different from the equilibrium locations in Hotelling’s location model. Our results suggest that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the number of firms is even. We also provide examples of subgame perfect equilibria in which the network externality is different for some of the firms.

Hệ thống bầu cử liên minh ở Pháp được mô hình hóa như một trò chơi hợp tác không có thanh toán bên ngoài dành cho n người. Các bên chơi là các đảng chính trị có mục tiêu tối đa hóa ghế ngồi. Mỗi khu vực bầu cử là một trò chơi độc lập. Giải pháp Von Neumann và Morgenstern được áp dụng để tạo ra các dự đoán lý thuyết cho một tập hợp quan sát từ cuộc bầu cử quốc hội Pháp năm 1951. Về mặt thống kê, giải pháp này có mức độ giải thích khiêm tốn nhưng đáng kể.

Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game.

It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope.