Priority PerdurantismAnnalen der Philosophie - - Trang 1-26 - 2022
Jeremy W. Skrzypek
In this paper, I introduce a version of perdurantism called Priority Perdurantism, according to which perduring, four-dimensional objects are ontologically fundamental and the temporal parts of those objects are ontologically derivative, depending for their existence and their identity on the four-dimensional wholes of which they are parts. I argue that by switching the order of the priority relat...... hiện toàn bộ
Book ReviewAnnalen der Philosophie - Tập 65 - Trang 427-432 - 2007
Donata Romizi
Hamiltonian PrivilegeAnnalen der Philosophie - - Trang 1-24 - 2023
Josh Hunt, Gabriele Carcassi, Christine Aidala
We argue that Hamiltonian mechanics is more fundamental than Lagrangian mechanics. Our argument provides a non-metaphysical strategy for privileging one formulation of a theory over another: ceteris paribus, a more general formulation is more fundamental. We illustrate this criterion through a novel interpretation of classical mechanics, based on three physical conditions. Two of these conditions ...... hiện toàn bộ
Epistemic Deontology and VoluntarinessAnnalen der Philosophie - Tập 77 - Trang 65-94 - 2011
Conor McHugh
We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy ...... hiện toàn bộ
Reflective Awareness, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Phenomenal ExplanationismAnnalen der Philosophie - - 2024
Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if a subject S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent ju...... hiện toàn bộ
Simple Hyperintensional Belief RevisionAnnalen der Philosophie - Tập 84 - Trang 559-575 - 2018
F. Berto
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to tr...... hiện toàn bộ