Priority PerdurantismAnnalen der Philosophie - - Trang 1-26 - 2022
Jeremy W. Skrzypek
In this paper, I introduce a version of perdurantism called Priority
Perdurantism, according to which perduring, four-dimensional objects are
ontologically fundamental and the temporal parts of those objects are
ontologically derivative, depending for their existence and their identity on
the four-dimensional wholes of which they are parts. I argue that by switching
the order of the priority relat... hiện toàn bộ
Book ReviewAnnalen der Philosophie - Tập 65 - Trang 427-432 - 2007
Donata Romizi
Hamiltonian PrivilegeAnnalen der Philosophie - - Trang 1-24 - 2023
Josh Hunt, Gabriele Carcassi, Christine Aidala
We argue that Hamiltonian mechanics is more fundamental than Lagrangian
mechanics. Our argument provides a non-metaphysical strategy for privileging one
formulation of a theory over another: ceteris paribus, a more general
formulation is more fundamental. We illustrate this criterion through a novel
interpretation of classical mechanics, based on three physical conditions. Two
of these conditions ... hiện toàn bộ
Epistemic Deontology and VoluntarinessAnnalen der Philosophie - Tập 77 - Trang 65-94 - 2011
Conor McHugh
We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly
deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are
improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are
voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a
number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in
fact voluntary (This strategy ... hiện toàn bộ
Reflective Awareness, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Phenomenal ExplanationismAnnalen der Philosophie - - 2024
Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that
P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of
her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have
argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if a subject
S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent
ju... hiện toàn bộ
Simple Hyperintensional Belief RevisionAnnalen der Philosophie - Tập 84 - Trang 559-575 - 2018
F. Berto
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision
operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting
similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM
belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical
logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead
to tr... hiện toàn bộ
Opaque Grounding and Grounding ReductionismAnnalen der Philosophie - - Trang 1-27 - 2023
Henrik Rydéhn
This article aims to contribute to the largely neglected issue of whether
metaphysical grounding – the relation of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of the
obtaining of some other (or others) – can be given a reductive account. I
introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding, a form of grounding
which constitutes a less metaphysically intimate connection than in standard
cases. I then argue... hiện toàn bộ