Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision

Alchourrón, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet functions for contraction and revision. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50, 510–530. Anderson, A. R., & Belnap, N. (1975). Entailment: The logic of relevance and necessity I. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Anderson, A. R., Belnap, N., & Dunn, J. M. (1992). Entailment: The logic of relevance and necessity II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Angell, R. B. (1977). Three systems of first degree entailment. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 47, 147. Asheim, G., & Sövik, Y. (2005). Preference-based belief operators. Mathematical Social Sciences, 50, 61–82. Baltag, A., & Smets, S. (2008). A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision. In G. Bonanno, W. van der Hoek, & M. Wooldridge (Eds.), Logic and the foundations of game and decision theory (pp. 9–58). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Berto, F. (2013). Impossible worlds. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/. Berto, F. (2014). On conceiving the inconsistent. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114, 21–103. Berto, F. (2017a). Aboutness in imagination. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0937-y. Berto, F. (2017b). Impossible worlds and the logic of imagination. Erkenntnis, 82, 1277–1297. Board, O. (2004). Dynamic interactive epistemology. Games and Economic Behaviour, 49, 49–80. Bonanno, G. (2005). A simple modal logic for belief revision. Synthèse, 147, 193–228. Chopra, S., & Parikh, R. (2000). Relevance sensitive belief structures. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 28, 259–285. Del Cerro, L. F., & Herzig, A. (1996). Belief change and dependence. In TARK proceedings, pp. 147–161. Fagin, R., & Halpern, J. (1988). Belief, awareness and limited reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 34, 39–76. Fagin, R., Halpern, J., Moses, Y., & Vardi, M. (1995). Reasoning about knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ferguson, T. M. (2014). A computational interpretation of conceptivism. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic, 24, 333–367. Fine, K. (1986). Analytic implication. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27, 169–179. Fine, K. (2015). Angellic content. Journal of Philosophical Logic. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9371-9. Floridi, L. (2005). Is information meaningful data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2), 351–370. French, R. (2017). A simple sequent calculus for angell’s logic of analytic containment. Studia Logica, 105(5), 971–994. Gabbay, D. (1985). Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning. Berlin: Springer. Girard, P., & Rott, H. (2014). Belief revision and dynamic logic. In A. Baltag & S. Smets (Eds.), Johan van Benthem on logic and information dynamics (pp. 203–233). Dordrecht: Springer. Grove, A. (1988). Two modellings for theory change. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17, 157–170. Hansson, S. O. (1999). A textbook of belief dynamics: Theory change and database updating. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Hansson, S., & Wassermann, R. (2002). Local change. Studia Logica, 70, 49–76. Hawke, P. (2017). Theories of aboutness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1388826. Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and belief. An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Jago, M. (2007). Hintikka and cresswell on logical omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 15, 325–354. Jago, M. (2014). The impossible. An essay on hyperintensionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39, 341–350. Kiourti, I. (2010). Real impossible worlds: The bounds of possibility. PhD thesis, University of St Andrews. Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., & Magidor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44, 167–207. Leitgeb, H., & Segerberg, K. (2005). Dynamic doxastic logic: Why, how, and where to? Synthèse, 155, 167–190. Levesque, H. (1984). A logic of implicit and explicit belief. In National conference on AI, AAAI-84 (pp. 198–202). Levi, I. (1991). The fixation of belief and its undoing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1999). DDL unlimited: Dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents. Erkenntnis, 50, 353–385. Meyer, J. J. (2001). Epistemic logic. In L. Goble (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to philosophical logic (pp. 182–202). Oxford: Blackwell. Moss, L. S., Baltag, A., & Solecki, S. (1998). The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions. In I. Gilboa (Ed.), Proceedings of TARK 98 (pp. 43–56). Evanston, IL: Morgan and Kaufmann. Nolan, D. (1997). Impossible worlds: A modest approach. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38, 535–572. Peppas, P., Williams, M. A., & Chopra, S. (2015). Relevance in belief revision. Artificial Intelligence, 229, 126–138. Priest, G. (1987). In contradiction (2nd ed., Vol. 2006). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Priest, G. (2001). An introduction to non-classical logic (2nd ed., Vol. 2008). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rantala, V. (1982). Impossible world semantics and logical omniscience. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 35, 106–115. Schipper, B. (2015). Awareness. In H. van Ditmarsch, J. Halpern, W. van der Hoek, & B. Kooi (Eds.), Handbook of epistemic logic (pp. 79–146). London: College Publications. Segerberg, K. (1995). Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Bulletin of the IGPL, 3, 535–553. Spohn, W. (1988). Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of epistemic states. In L. W. Hrper & B. Skyrms (Eds.), Causation in decision: Belief change, and statistics (Vol. 2, pp. 105–134). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Tanaka, K., Berto, F., Mares, E., & Paoli, F. (Eds.). (2013). Paraconsistency: Logic and applications. Dordrecht: Springer. van Benthem, J. (2007). Dynamic logic for belief revision. Journal of Applied Non-classical Logic, 17, 129–155. van Benthem, J. (2011). Logical dynamics of information and interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Benthem, J., & Smets, S. (2015). Dynamic logics of belief change. In H. van Ditmarsch, J. Halpern, W. van der Hoek, & B. Kooi (Eds.), Handbook of epistemic logic (pp. 313–393). London: College Publications. van Ditmarsch, H. P. (2005). Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision. Synthèse, 147, 229–275. van Ditmarsch, H. P., van der Hoek, W., & Kooi, B. (2007). Dynamic epistemic logic. Dordrecht: Springer. Wansing, H. (1990). A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief. Studia Logica, 49, 523–539. Yablo, S. (2014). Aboutness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.