Reflective Awareness, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Phenomenal Explanationism
Annalen der Philosophie - 2024
Tóm tắt
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if a subject S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its anti-sceptical bite. This article provides a novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021).
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Berghofer, P. (2020). Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification. Synthese, 197, 155–183.
Cohen, S. (2005). Why basic knowledge is easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 417–430.
Feldman, & Richard and Earl Conee. (2018). Between belief and disbelief. (Ed.), Believing in accordance with the evidence: New essays on evidentialism (pp. 71–89). Springer. Kevin McCain.
Foley, R. (1993). Working without a net. Oxford University Press.
Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Rowman & Littlefield.
Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74, 30–55.
Kriegel, U. (2023). The structure of phenomenal justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101, 282–297.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the best explanation. 2nd Edition. New York: Routledge.
Markie Peter. (2005). Easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 406–416.
McCain, K., & Moretti, L. (2021). Appearance and explanation: Phenomenal explanationism in epistemology. Oxford University Press.
McGrath, M. (2013). Phenomenal conservatism and cognitive penetration: The bad basis counterexamples. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and justification: New essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism (pp. 225–247). Oxford University Press.
Moretti, L. (2015). Phenomenal conservatism. Analysis, 75, 296–309.
Moretti, L. (2018). Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 267–280.
Moretti, L. (2020). Seemings and epistemic justification: How appearances justify beliefs. Springer.
Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous, 34, 517–549.
Pryor, J. (2004). What’s wrong with Moore’s argument? Philosophical Issue, 14, Epistemology349–Epistemology378.
Sartre, J. P. (1940/2004). The imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination. London: Routledge.
Tolhurst, W. (1998). Seemings American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 293–302.
Tucker, C. (2013). Seemings and justification: An introduction. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and justification: New essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism (pp. 1–29). New York Oxford University.
Yablo, S. (1993). Is conceivability a guide to possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 1–42.