Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 61 - Trang 801-816 - 2023
Kazuya Kikuchi1
1Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, Japan

Tóm tắt

This paper studies the allocation of voting weights in a committee representing groups of different sizes. We introduce a partial ordering of weight allocations based on stochastic comparison of social welfare. We show that when the number of groups is sufficiently large, this ordering asymptotically coincides with the total ordering induced by the cosine proportionality between the weights and the group sizes. A corollary is that a class of expectation-form objective functions, including expected welfare, the mean majority deficit and the probability of inversions, are asymptotically monotone in the cosine proportionality.

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