The role of the lived-body in feeling

Continental Philosophy Review - Tập 41 - Trang 127-142 - 2008
Bernhard Waldenfels1
1Department of Philosophy, University of Bochum, Bochum, Germany

Tóm tắt

Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is not formed through the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a process that is susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning, which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is confronted by disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings makes the brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living organ that selects and “evaluates” what is “important.” Finally, cross-cultural comparison shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding and willing, which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to mention a highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different studies on gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler, Gefühle und Urteilskraft. Ein Plädoyer für die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The following reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and takes the pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its point of departure.

Tài liệu tham khảo

Descartes, René. 1951. Meditations on first philosophy (trans: Lafleur, L.J.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Emde, Robert N. ed. 1983. René A. Spitz: Dialogues from infancy, selected papers. New York: International Universities Press.

Fink-Eitel, H., and G. Lohmann. ed. 1994. Zur Philosophie der Gefühle. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

von Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. 1961. Faust (trans: Kaufmann, W.). New York: Anchor Books.

Goldstein, Kurt. 1934. Der Aufbau des Organismus. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Grüny, Christian. 2004. Zerstörung der Erfahrung. Eine Phänomenologie des Schmerzes. Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen und Neumann.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. Phenomenology of spirit (trans: Miller, A.V.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time (trans: Macquarrie, J., and E. Robinson). New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

Heine, Heinrich. 1976. Vorwort zu Geständnisse. In Sämtliche Schriften, Vol. 6/I. Carl Hanser: Munich.

Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The crisis of European Sciences and transcendental phenomenology (trans: Carr, D.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, Edmund. 1989. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, second book (trans: Rojcewicz, R., and A. Schuwer). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Husserl, Edmund. 1999. Cartesian meditations (trans: Cairns, D.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Husserl, Edmund. 2001. Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic (trans: Steinbock, A.J.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Kant, Immanuel. 2003. The critique of pure reason (trans: Smith, N.K.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kant, Immanuel. 2004. Prolegomena to any future metaphysics (translated and edited: Hatfield, G.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Kerckhoven, Guy. 2001. In Verlegenheit geraten. Die Befangenheit des Menschen als anthropologischer Leitfaden in Hans Lipps’ ‘Die menschliche Natur.’ In Revista de filosofía 26: 55–84.

Kleist, Heinrich. 1952. Über die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden. In Sämtliche Werke. Munich: Helmut Sembdner.

Libet, Benjamin. 2004. Mind time: The temporal factor in consciousness. Boston: Harvard University Press.

Lichtenburg, Georg Christoph. 1990. Aphorisms (trans: Hollingdale, R.J.). London: Penguin.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. Phenomenology of perception (trans: Smith, C.). New York. Routledge.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1989a. Beyond good and evil (trans: Kaufmann, W.). New York: Vintage Books.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1989b. On the genealogy of morals (trans: Kaufmann, W.). New York: Vintage Books.

Ricœur, Paul. 2007. Freedom and nature: The voluntary and the involuntary (trans: Kohák, E.V.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Roth, Gerhard. 1997. Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Scheler, Max. 1976. Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. In Späte Schriften, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 9. Bern/München: Francke Verlag.

Scheler, Max. 1979. The nature of sympathy (trans: Heath, P.). London: Routledge and K. Paul.

Scheler, Max. 2008. The human place in the Cosmos (trans: Frings, M.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press (in press).

Seethaler, Carola Meier. 1997. Gefühle und Urteilskraft. Ein Plädoyer für die emotionale Vernunft. Munich: C.H. Beck.

Sophocles. 1991. Antigone. In The oedipus plays of sophocles (trans: Roche, P.). New York: Mentor.

Straus, Erwin. 1956. Vom Sinn der Sinne. Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg: Springer.

Thoma, Ludwig. 1962. Onkel Peppi und andere Erzählen. Munich: Paul List Verlag.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1994. Antwortregister. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1997. Wertqualitäten oder Erfahrungsansprüche? In Vom Umsturz der Werte in der modernen Gesellschaft, ed., G. Pafafferott. Bonn: Bouvier.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1998a. Der beunruhigte Blick. In Sinnesschwellen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1998b. Grenzen der Normalisierung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2002. Bruchlinen der Erfahrung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2004. Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Waldenfels, Bernhard, and Regula Giuliani. 2000. Das leibliche Selbst. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Continental Philosophy Review

Tập 41

127-142

Thông tin tác giả