The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 13 - Trang 387-403 - 2012
Leo Wangler1, Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera2, Hans-Peter Weikard3
1Institut für Innovation und Technik (iit), Berlin, Germany
2Department of Economics, Growth and Environment Group, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, Mexico City, Mexico
3Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands

Tóm tắt

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.

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Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Tập 13

387-403

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