Renegotiations in the Greenhouse

Altamirano-Cabrera J-C, Finus M (2006) Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements. J Appl Econ 9: 19–47 Asheim GB, Bretteville Froyn C, Hovi J, Menz FC (2006) Regional versus global cooperation for climate control. J Environ Econ Manage 51: 93–109 Babiker MH (2001) The CO2 abatement game: costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition. J Econ Dyn Control 25: 1–34 Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46: 878–894 Barrett S (1999) A theory of full international cooperation. J Theor Polit 11(4): 519–541 Bernheim BD, Ray D (1989) Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 1: 295–326 Bernheim BD, Peleg B, Whinston MD (1987) Coalition-proof Nash equilibria I. Concepts. J Econ Theor 42: 1–12 Botteon M, Carraro C (1997) Burden-sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asymmetric countries. In: Carraro C (eds) International environmental negotiations: strategic policy issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 26–55 Caparrós A, Pereau J-C, Tazdaït T (2004) North–south climate change negotiations: a sequential game with asymmetric information. Public Choice 121(3–4): 455–480 Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for international protection of the environment. J Public Econ 52: 309–328 Chander P, Tulkens H (1995) A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution. Int Tax Public Finance 2: 279–293 Ciscar JC, Soria A (2002) Prospective analysis of beyond Kyoto climate policy: a sequential game framework. Energy Policy 30: 1327–1335 d’Aspremont C, Jaquemin A, Gabszewicz JJ, Weymark JA (1983) On the stability of collusive price leadership. Can J Econ 16(1): 17–25 Dellink RB, Altamirano-Cabrera J-C, Finus M, van Ierland EC, Ruijs A, Weikard H-P (2004) Empirical background paper of the STACO model, mimeo, Wageningen University Dellink RB, Finus M, Olieman N (2008) The stability likelihood of an international environmental agreement. Environ Resour Econ 39: 357–377 De Zeeuw A (2008) Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements. J Environ Econ Manage 55: 163–174 Ellerman AD, Decaux A (1998) Analysis of post-Kyoto CO2 emissions trading using marginal abatement curves. Joint program on the science and policy of global change Report 40, MIT, Cambridge Eyckmans J, Tulkens H (2003) Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem. Resour Energy Econ 25: 299–327 Fankhauser S (1995) Valuing climate change. Earthscan, London Farrell J, Maskin E (1989) Renegotiation in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 1: 327–360 Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998) Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient. Environ Resour Econ 12: 275–306 Finus M, van Ierland EC, Dellink RB (2006) Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game. Econ Gov 7: 271–291 Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54: 533–554 Germain M, Van Steenberghe V (2003) Constraining equitable allocations of tradable CO2 emission quotas by acceptability. Environ Resour Econ 26: 469–492 Germain M, Toint P, Tulkens H, de Zeeuw A (2003) Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control. J Econ Dyn Control 28: 79–99 Hoel M (1992) International environmental conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environ Resour Econ 2: 141–159 Kolstad CD (2007) Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. J Environ Econ Manage 53: 68–79 McGinty M (2007) International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxf Econ Pap 59: 45–62 Na S, Shin HS (1998) International environmental agreements under uncertainty. Oxf Econ Pap 50: 173–185 Nagashima M, Dellink RB, van Ierland EC, Weikard H-P (2009) Stability of international climate coalitions—a comparison of transfer schemes. Ecol Econ 68: 1476–1487 Nordhaus WD (1994) Managing the global commons: the economics of climate change. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Reilly J-M (2005) Emission paths in the MIT–EPPA model, personal communication Rubio SJ, Ulph A (2002) A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant. Discussion paper in economics and econometrics 0209, Department of Economics, University of Southampton Rubio SJ, Ulph A (2007) An infinite horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements. J Environ Econ Manage 54: 296–310 Sáiz ME, Hendrix EMT, Olieman NJ (2006) On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games. Comput Econ 28: 251–275 Tol RSJ (1997) A decision-analytic treatise of the enhanced greenhouse effect. Ph.D. thesis, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam Ulph A (2004) Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning. J Risk Uncertain 29: 53–73 Weikard H-P (2009) Cartel stability under an optimal sharing rule. Manchester Sch 77(5): 599–616 Weikard H-P, Dellink RB (2008) Sticks and carrots for the design of climate agreements with renegotiations. FEEM working paper 26.2008. Venice, Itlay Weikard H-P, Finus M, Altamirano-Cabrera J-C (2006) The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 58: 209–232