The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion

Mathematical Social Sciences - Tập 61 - Trang 58-64 - 2011
Bram Driesen1, Andrés Perea1, Hans Peters1
1Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

Tài liệu tham khảo

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