Opaque Grounding and Grounding Reductionism

Annalen der Philosophie - Trang 1-27 - 2023
Henrik Rydéhn1
1Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Tóm tắt

This article aims to contribute to the largely neglected issue of whether metaphysical grounding – the relation of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of the obtaining of some other (or others) – can be given a reductive account. I introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding, a form of grounding which constitutes a less metaphysically intimate connection than in standard cases. I then argue that certain important and interesting views in metaphysics are committed to there being cases of opaque grounding and demonstrate that four representative accounts of grounding available in the literature are unable to accommodate such cases. This is argued to constitute a problem for those accounts that is likely to extend to other possible reductive accounts of grounding that employ the popular strategy of explaining grounding in terms of other hyperintensional phenomena. Unless the reductionist is willing to opt for some sophisticated modalist account, the possibility of opaque grounding cases thus provides indirect support for primitivism about grounding, a view that has previously been widely embraced but rarely supported by argument.

Tài liệu tham khảo

Bennett, K. (2011). By our bootstraps. Philosophical Perspectives, 25, 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00207.x.

Bennett, K. (2017). Making things up. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682683.001.0001.

Berker, S. (2018). The unity of grounding. Mind, 127(507), 729–777. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw069.

Bliss, R. (2013). Viciousness and the structure of reality. Philosophical Studies, 166(2), 399–418. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0043-0.

Broad, C. D. (1942). Certain features in Moore’s ethical doctrines. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore (pp. 41–67). Northwestern University Press.

Correia, F. (2013). Metaphysical grounds and essence. In M. Hoeltje, B. Schnieder, & A. Steinberg (Eds.), Varieties of dependence: Ontological dependence, grounding, supervenience, response-dependence (pp. 271–296). Philosophia Verlag.

Daly, C. (2012). Scepticism about grounding. In F. Correia, & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. 81–100). Cambridge University Press.

Dasgupta, S. (2014). The possibility of physicalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 111(9), 557–592. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20141119/1037.

Depaul, M. R. (1987). Supervenience and moral dependence. Philosophical Studies, 51(3), 425–439. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354046.

Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1–16.

Fine, K. (2012). Guide to ground. In F. Correia, & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. 37–80). Cambridge University Press.

Fogal, D., & Risberg, O. (2020). The metaphysics of moral explanations. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics vol. 15 (pp. 170–194). Oxford University Press.

Hofweber, T. (2009). Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. 260–289). Oxford University Press.

Kim, J. (1990). Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy, 21(1–2), 1–27.

Kment, B. (2014). Modality and explanatory reasoning. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001.

Koslicki, K. (2015). The coarse-grainedness of grounding. In K. Bennett, & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), Oxford studies in metaphysics vol. 9 (pp. 306–344). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0011.

Leary, S. (2017). Non-naturalism and normative necessities. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics vol. 12 (pp. 76–105). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0004.

Leary, S. (2022). What is non-naturalism? Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 8(52), 787–814. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2253.

Litland, J. E. (2017). Grounding ground. In K. Bennett, & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), Oxford studies in metaphysics vol. 10 (pp. 279–316). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791973.003.0012.

McDaniel, K. (2017). The fragmentation of being. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719656.001.0001.

McDaniel, B. (2022). Grounding as minimal necessitation. Inquiry, 65(2), 154–175. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658632.

Moore, G. E. (1942). A reply to my critics. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore (pp. 533–677). Northwestern University Press.

Moore, G. E. [1903]. (1993). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.

Paakkunainen, H. (2018). The ‘just too different’ objection to normative naturalism. Philosophy Compass, 13(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12473.

Passinsky, A. (2019). Finean feminist metaphysics. Inquiry, 64(9), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1669984.

Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In B. Hale, & A. Hoffmann (Eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology (pp. 109–135). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007.

Rosen, G. (2017). Metaphysical relations in metaethics. In T. McPherson, & D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of metaethics (pp. 151–169). Routledge.

Rosen, G. (2020). What is normative necessity? In M. Dumitru (Ed.), Metaphysics, meaning, and modality: Themes from Kit Fine (pp. 205–233). Oxford University Press.

Ross, W. D. (1903). The right and the good (2002.). Clarendon Press.

Rydéhn, H. (2022). Metaphysically opaque grounding. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 52(7), 729–745. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.11.

Schaffer, J. (2009). On what grounds what. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. 347–383). Oxford University Press.

Schaffer, J. (2016). Grounding in the image of causation. Philosophical Studies, 173, 49–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1.

Schaffer, J. (2017). Social construction as grounding; or: Fundamentality for feminists, a reply to Barnes and Mikkola. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2449–2465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0738-8.

Schroeder, M. (2005). Realism and reduction: The quest for robustness. Philosophers’ Imprint, 5(1), 1–18.

Skiles, A. (2015). Against grounding necessitarianism. Erkenntnis, 80(4), 717–751. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9669-y.

Sturgeon, N. L. (2007). Ethical naturalism. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory (pp. 91–121). Oxford University Press.

Trogdon, K. (2013). Grounding: Necessary or contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(4), 465–485. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12009.

Trogdon, K., & Witmer, D. G. (2021). Full and partial grounding. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 7(2), 252–271. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2020.26.

Väyrynen, P. (2018). The supervenience challenge to non-naturalism. In T. McPherson, & D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (pp. 170–184). Routledge.

Wilsch, T. (2015). The nomological account of ground. Philosophical Studies, 172(12), 3293–3312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0470-9.

Wilsch, T. (2016). The deductive-nomological account of metaphysical explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1033637.

Wilson, J. (2014). No work for a theory of grounding. Inquiry, 57(5–6), 535–579. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.907542.

Wilson, J. (2017). Determinables and determinates. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (spring 2017 edition). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/determinate-determinables/.

Wilson, A. (2018). Metaphysical causation. Noûs, 52(4), 723–751. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12190.

Witmer, D. G., Butchard, W., & Trogdon, K. (2005). Intrinsicality without naturalness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2), 326–350. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00530.x.

Zylstra, J. (2019). The essence of grounding. Synthese, 196(12), 5137–5152. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1701-3.

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Annalen der Philosophie

1-27

Thông tin tác giả