Knighthoods, damehoods, and CEO behaviour

Journal of Corporate Finance - Tập 59 - Trang 302-319 - 2019
Konrad Raff1, Linus Siming2
1Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Finance, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway
2Audencia Business School, Institute of Finance, 8 Route de la Jonelière, 44312 Nantes, France

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