The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation

Journal of Financial Economics - Tập 123 - Trang 313-336 - 2017
Florens Focke1, Ernst Maug1, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi1
1Department of Finance, University of Mannheim, L9, 1–2, 68131 Mannheim, Germany

Tài liệu tham khảo

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