Corporate governance, ownership structure, cash holdings, and firm value on the Ghana Stock Exchange

Emerald - Tập 10 Số 5 - Trang 488-499 - 2009
Zangina Isshaq1, Godfred A. Bokpin2, Joseph Mensah Onumah3
1Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Business, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana
2Department of Finance, University of Ghana Business School, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
3Department of Accounting, University of Ghana Business School, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

Tóm tắt

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between corporate governance, ownership structure, cash holdings, and firm value on the Ghana Stock Exchange.

Design/methodology/approach

A multiple regression approach using the seemingly unrelated regression to mitigate the problems of multicollinearity between the cash‐holding variable and other control variables is adopted.

Findings

Board size is found to be positively and statistically significantly related to share price among the corporate governance variables. However, a significant relationship between inside ownership and share price is not found. The results also indicate that additional units of cash holdings do not have a statistically significant influence on share price. Finally, leverage and income volatility are found to be significant determinants of share price.

Originality/value

This is the first of its kind in the country that considers the impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm value on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE).


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Emerald

Tập 10 Số 5

488-499

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