Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes<sup>*</sup>
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 123 Số 2 - Trang 441-487 - 2008
Railroads and American Economic Growth: A “Market Access” Approach * Abstract
This article examines the historical impact of railroads on the U.S. economy, with a focus on quantifying the aggregate impact on the agricultural sector in 1890. Expansion of the railroad network may have affected all counties directly or indirectly—an econometric challenge that arises in many empirical settings. However, the total impact on each county is captured by changes in that county’s “market access,” a reduced-form expression derived from general equilibrium trade theory. We measure counties’ market access by constructing a network database of railroads and waterways and calculating lowest-cost county-to-county freight routes. We estimate that county agricultural land values increased substantially with increases in county market access, as the railroad network expanded from 1870 to 1890. Removing all railroads in 1890 is estimated to decrease the total value of U.S. agricultural land by 60%, with limited potential for mitigating these losses through feasible extensions to the canal network or improvements to country roads.
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 131 Số 2 - Trang 799-858 - 2016
Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 117 Số 4 - Trang 1295-1328 - 2002
A Political Theory of Populism * Abstract
When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies—that is, policies to the left of the median voter—as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies.
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 128 Số 2 - Trang 771-805 - 2013
Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 104 Số 2 - Trang 325 - 1989
Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 104 Số 2 - Trang 275 - 1989
External Economies of Scale and Competitive Equilibrium
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 84 Số 3 - Trang 347 - 1970
A Language Theory of Discrimination
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 101 Số 2 - Trang 363 - 1986
The Developing World is Poorer than We Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty
Quarterly Journal of Economics - Tập 125 Số 4 - Trang 1577-1625 - 2010
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