Quarterly Journal of Economics
0033-5533
1531-4650
Anh Quốc
Cơ quản chủ quản: Oxford University Press , OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
Lĩnh vực:
Economics and Econometrics
Phân tích ảnh hưởng
Thông tin về tạp chí
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is the oldest professional journal of economics in the English language. Edited at Harvard University's Department of Economics, it covers all aspects of the field. QJE is invaluable to professional and academic economists and students around the world.
Các bài báo tiêu biểu
Railroads and American Economic Growth: A “Market Access” Approach * Abstract
This article examines the historical impact of railroads on the U.S. economy, with a focus on quantifying the aggregate impact on the agricultural sector in 1890. Expansion of the railroad network may have affected all counties directly or indirectly—an econometric challenge that arises in many empirical settings. However, the total impact on each county is captured by changes in that county’s “market access,” a reduced-form expression derived from general equilibrium trade theory. We measure counties’ market access by constructing a network database of railroads and waterways and calculating lowest-cost county-to-county freight routes. We estimate that county agricultural land values increased substantially with increases in county market access, as the railroad network expanded from 1870 to 1890. Removing all railroads in 1890 is estimated to decrease the total value of U.S. agricultural land by 60%, with limited potential for mitigating these losses through feasible extensions to the canal network or improvements to country roads.
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Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes<sup>*</sup>
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Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
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A Political Theory of Populism * Abstract
When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies—that is, policies to the left of the median voter—as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies.
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Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences
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Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence
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The Developing World is Poorer than We Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty
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