Journal of Management

Because partners may behave opportunistically in alliances, contractual safeguards or trust between partners are necessary for successful outcomes. However, it remains controversial whether safeguards and trust substitute or complement each other. Drawing on transaction cost theory, this study conceptualizes both contractual safeguards and trust as important control mechanisms in non-equity alliances, and develops a model that relates contractual safeguards and trust to cooperative outcomes. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 233 architect–contractor partnerships in Hong Kong. The results show that the relationship between contractual safeguards and cooperative outcomes depends on both the level and type of trust.

In the past decade there has been growing internationally-based evidence towards a trend in organizational staffing strategies which have placed emphasis upon the direct or brokered hiring of workers on temporary, fixed-term or “contingent” employment contracts in lieu of contracts with the implication of an ongoing relationship. Concurrently, there has been an emergence of research activity concerning individual and organizational-level consequences associated with the increased organizational reliance on fixed-term contracts in the workplace. This paper provides an overview of the contingent work literature and identifies topical themes and research questions which have been the primary focus of attention, as well as the possible causal interrelationships among the diverse constructs which have been examined. The paper highlights aspects of the existing research that may benefit from further exploration, as well as consideration of a number of theoretical and methodological issues which have also emerged. © 2004Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.