GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review
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Corporate Management of Highly Dynamic Risks: Evidence from the Demand for Terrorism Insurance in Germany
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - - 2012
Welfare analysis in insurance markets
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - - 2024
“Efficiency” in economics can be employed in two distinct ways: as a statement
about the class of policies that all policy advisors would agree to, regardless
of their views about distributional preferences; or as something valuable that
policy advisors potentially need to trade-off against equity goals. This
distinction can be safely put to the side in some settings, for instance when
information...
Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 39 Số 2 - Trang 222-253 - 2014
Which Price is Right: Load or Premium?
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 33 - Trang 90-105 - 2008
This paper uses national time series data for the United States to investigate
whether changes in the premium or loading fee offer a better explanation for
variations in the percentage of the population with private health insurance
from 1960 to 2004. The empirical results suggest that premium provides a better
measure of price when estimating the demand for health insurance at the
extensive margi...
On the role of market insurance in a dynamic model
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 32 - Trang 61-90 - 2007
Durables like cars or houses are a substantial component in the balance sheets
of households. These durables are exposed to risk and can be insured in the
market. We build a dynamic model in which agents have three possibilities to
cope with the risk exposure of the durable stock: (i) purchase of market
insurance, (ii) buffer-stock saving of the riskless asset or (iii) adjustment of
the durable st...
Parametric insurance and technology adoption in developing countries
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 47 - Trang 7-44 - 2021
Technology adoption is crucial for the development of low-income countries. This
paper investigates how parametric insurance can contribute to improving access
to finance, and hence to technology, for smallholder farmers. In a model with
moral hazard, we show that bundling parametric insurance with loans may lower
collateral requirements, thus promoting the financial inclusion of poor
households. ...
Liability, Insurance and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 40 - Trang 171-193 - 2014
We examine the incentives to obtain information about risk under strict
liability and negligence rules when insurance is available. Information helps
reduce the expected cost of accidents, but also exposes the potential injurer to
classification risk. As a result, the social value of information may be
negative. Under both strict liability and negligence, the private value of
information may also ...
New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 39 - Trang 136-152 - 2014
We provide an overview of the paths taken to understand existence and efficiency
of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection since the
seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). A stream of recent work
reconsiders the strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium by carefully
modelling the market game.
Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 30 - Trang 57-69 - 2005
Formulating the classic Allingham and Sandmo [1972] tax compliance problem under
Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) provides a simple explanation for the
“excess” level of full compliance observed in empirical studies, which standard
Expected Utility (EU) theory is unable to explain. RDEU provides a compelling
answer to this puzzle, without the need for the moral sentiments or stigma
arguments...
Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 40th Anniversary Issue
GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 40 - Trang 89-96 - 2015
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