Welfare analysis in insurance marketsGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - - 2024
Casey Rothschild
“Efficiency” in economics can be employed in two distinct ways: as a statement about the class of policies that all policy advisors would agree to, regardless of their views about distributional preferences; or as something valuable that policy advisors potentially need to trade-off against equity goals. This distinction can be safely put to the side in some settings, for instance when information...... hiện toàn bộ
Which Price is Right: Load or Premium?GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 33 - Trang 90-105 - 2008
Rexford E Santerre
This paper uses national time series data for the United States to investigate whether changes in the premium or loading fee offer a better explanation for variations in the percentage of the population with private health insurance from 1960 to 2004. The empirical results suggest that premium provides a better measure of price when estimating the demand for health insurance at the extensive margi...... hiện toàn bộ
On the role of market insurance in a dynamic modelGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 32 - Trang 61-90 - 2007
Helge Braun, Winfried Koeniger
Durables like cars or houses are a substantial component in the balance sheets of households. These durables are exposed to risk and can be insured in the market. We build a dynamic model in which agents have three possibilities to cope with the risk exposure of the durable stock: (i) purchase of market insurance, (ii) buffer-stock saving of the riskless asset or (iii) adjustment of the durable st...... hiện toàn bộ
Parametric insurance and technology adoption in developing countriesGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 47 - Trang 7-44 - 2021
Enrico Biffis, Erik Chavez, Alexis Louaas, Pierre Picard
Technology adoption is crucial for the development of low-income countries. This paper investigates how parametric insurance can contribute to improving access to finance, and hence to technology, for smallholder farmers. In a model with moral hazard, we show that bundling parametric insurance with loans may lower collateral requirements, thus promoting the financial inclusion of poor households. ...... hiện toàn bộ
Liability, Insurance and the Incentive to Obtain Information about RiskGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 40 - Trang 171-193 - 2014
Vickie Bajtelsmit, Paul Thistle
We examine the incentives to obtain information about risk under strict liability and negligence rules when insurance is available. Information helps reduce the expected cost of accidents, but also exposes the potential injurer to classification risk. As a result, the social value of information may be negative. Under both strict liability and negligence, the private value of information may also ...... hiện toàn bộ
New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive InsuranceGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 39 - Trang 136-152 - 2014
Wanda Mimra, Achim Wambach
We provide an overview of the paths taken to understand existence and efficiency of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). A stream of recent work reconsiders the strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium by carefully modelling the market game.
Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected UtilityGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review - Tập 30 - Trang 57-69 - 2005
Jean-Louis Arcand, Grégoire Rota Graziosi
Formulating the classic Allingham and Sandmo [1972] tax compliance problem under Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) provides a simple explanation for the “excess” level of full compliance observed in empirical studies, which standard Expected Utility (EU) theory is unable to explain. RDEU provides a compelling answer to this puzzle, without the need for the moral sentiments or stigma arguments...... hiện toàn bộ