Liability, Insurance and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk
Tóm tắt
We examine the incentives to obtain information about risk under strict liability and negligence rules when insurance is available. Information helps reduce the expected cost of accidents, but also exposes the potential injurer to classification risk. As a result, the social value of information may be negative. Under both strict liability and negligence, the private value of information may also be negative when insurance is available.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Aalberts, R., Hames, D. and Thistle, P. (2008) ‘Detours and frolics on the internet: Employer liability and management control of cybertorts’, Journal of Business Research, 62: 1335–1341.
Aalberts, R., Poon, P. and Thistle, P. (2010) ‘A tale of two internet service providers: A risk management perspective’, Communications of the ACM 53: 119–123.
Bajtelsmit, V. and Thistle, P. (2007) “Negligence, ignorance and the demand for liability insurance”, Proceedings of the Risk Theory Society, www.aria.org/rts/proceedings/2007/default.htm, accessed 14 October 2014.
Bajtelsmit, V. and Thistle, P. (2008) ‘The reasonable person negligence standard and liability insurance’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance 75 (4): 815–823.
Bajtelsmit, V. and Thistle, P. (2009) ‘Negligence, ignorance and the demand for liability insurance’, The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 34 (1): 105–116.
Bajtelsmit, V. and Thistle, P. (2013) Mistakes, negligence and liability, working paper.
Black, B., Cheffins, B. and Klausner, M. (2005) ‘Liability risk for outside directors: A cross-border analysis’, European Financial Management 11 (2): 153–171.
Black, B., Cheffins, B. and Klausner, M. (2006) ‘Outside director liability’, Stanford Law Review 58 (4): 1055–1160.
Cremer, J. and Khalil, F. (1994) ‘Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature’, European Economic Review 38 (3): 675–682.
Crocker, K. and Doherty, N. (2000) ‘Why people buy liability insurance under the rule of simple negligence’, in M.R. Baye (ed.) Advances in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Crocker, K. and Snow, A. (1992) ‘The social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies’, Journal of Public Economics 48 (3): 317–347.
Crocker, K. and Snow, A. (2013) ‘The theory of risk classification’, in G. Dionne (ed.) Handbook of Insurance, New York: Springer, pp. 281–313.
Doherty, N. and Thistle, P. (1996) ‘Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets’, Journal of Public Economics 63 (1): 83–102.
Fagart, M.C. and Fluet, C. (2009) ‘Liability insurance under the negligence rule’, RAND Journal of Economics 40 (3): 486–508.
Hoy, M. (1982) ‘Categorizing risks in the insurance industry’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 97 (2): 321–336.
Hua, X. (2011) ‘Product recall and liability’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 27 (1): 113–136.
Hyman, D., Black, B., Zeiler, K., Silver, C. and Sage, W. (2007) ‘Do defendants pay what juries award? Post-verdict haircuts in texas medical malpractice cases, 1988–2003’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4 (1): 3–68.
Jullien, B., Salanie, B. and Salanie, F. (1999) ‘Should risk averse agents exert more effort?’ The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 24 (1): 19–28.
Kaplow, L. (1994) ‘The value of accuracy in adjudication: An economic analysis’, Journal of Legal Studies 23 (1): 307–401.
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S. (1992) ‘Private versus socially optimal provision of ex ante legal advice’, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 8 (2): 306–320.
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S. (1996) ‘Accuracy in the assessment of damages’, Journal of Law and Economics 39 (1): 191–210.
Ligon, J. and Thistle, P. (1996a) ‘Information asymmetries and informational incentives in monopolistic insurance markets’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance 63 (3): 434–459.
Ligon, J. and Thistle, P. (1996b) ‘Consumer risk perception and information in insurance markets with adverse selection’, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 21 (1): 191–210.
Matthews, S. and Postlewaite, A. (1985) ‘Quality testing and disclosure’, Rand Journal of Economics 16 (3): 328–340.
Nosal, E. (2006) ‘Information gathering by a principal’, International Economic Review 47 (4): 1093–1111.
Polinski, A.M. and Shavell, S. (2012) ‘Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of product risks’, Journal of Law Economics and Organization 28 (2): 360–379.
Shavell, S. (1982) ‘On liability and insurance’, Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1): 120–132.
Shavell, S. (1987) Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shavell, S. (1992) ‘Liability and the incentive to obtain information about risk’, Journal of Legal Studies 21 (2): 259–270.
Silver, C., Zeiler, K., Black, B., Hyman, D. and Sage, W. (2008) ‘Malpractice payouts and malpractice insurance: Evidence from texas closed claims, 1990–2003’, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance — Issues and Practice 33 (1): 177–192.
Viscusi, W.K. (1978) ‘A note on “lemons” markets with quality certification’, Bell Journal of Economics 9 (1): 277–279.
Zeiler, K., Silver, C., Black, B., Hyman, D. and Sage, W. (2008) ‘Physician’s insurance limits and malpractice payments: Evidence from texas closed claims, 1990–2003’, Journal of Legal Studies 36 (S2): 9–45.