Tying by statutory dominant firms under differentiated (stricter) scrutiny? Insights from economic theory and competition practice
Tóm tắt
Statutory dominant firms, different from dominant firms that have gained their market power through competition on the merits, have derived their market position from choices made by the state. From an economic perspective, tying by this kind of firm typically generates significant anti-competitive effects that are likely to outweigh the possible pro-competitive effects. Both in China and the EU, such tying practices have frequently taken place. Nevertheless, the economic findings have not been fully reflected in competition provisions and competition practice in these two jurisdictions. This may lead to error costs and enforcement costs, which is detrimental to consumer welfare. It is thus important for competition authorities and courts to carefully consider the economic findings, while taking into account also the principles of proportionality and legal certainty. To enhance the effectiveness of competition law, this study proposes potential ways of applying a differentiated (stricter) scrutiny of tying by statutory dominant firms to reduce error costs and enforcement costs.
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