Two characterizations of the random arrival rule
Tóm tắt
The main focus of this note is on the random arrival rule. We adopt two characterizations from transferable utility games theory and reinterpret them in the framework of bankruptcy problems. One is that the random arrival rule can be formulated as the vector of marginal compensations of a potential function. The other one is that the random arrival rule is the only rule satisfying balanced compensations.
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