Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability

American Political Science Review - Tập 109 Số 4 - Trang 764-784 - 2015
James R. Hollyer1, B. Peter Rosendorff2, James Raymond Vreeland3
1University of Minnesota
2New York University
3Georgetown University

Tóm tắt

The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in actions such as strikes and protests is contingent upon her beliefs about others’ willingness to similarly mobilize. In this article, we examine the effect of a specific form of transparency—the disclosure of economic data by the government—on citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which, under autocratic rule, transparency increases the frequency of protests, and increases the extent to which protest is correlated with incumbent performance. We find empirical support for these claims. Transparency destabilizes autocracies via mass protest.

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