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Kích thước và phạm vi của chính phủ tại các bang Hoa Kỳ: Tư tưởng Đảng có quan trọng?
Tóm tắt
Chúng tôi tiến hành điều tra thực nghiệm xem tư tưởng của các đảng phái chính trị ảnh hưởng như thế nào đến kích thước và phạm vi của chính phủ, được đo lường thông qua kích thước chính phủ, cấu trúc thuế và quy định về thị trường lao động. Dữ liệu của chúng tôi bao gồm 49 bang của Hoa Kỳ trong giai đoạn 1993–2009. Chúng tôi sử dụng dữ liệu mới về bản đồ tư tưởng của các cơ quan lập pháp của Hoa Kỳ do Shor và McCarty cung cấp (Tạp chí Khoa học Chính trị Hoa Kỳ 105(3):530–551, 2011) mà xem xét sự khác biệt về không gian và thời gian trong tư tưởng của Đảng Dân chủ và Đảng Cộng hòa. Chúng tôi phân biệt giữa ba loại chính phủ chia sẻ quyền lực: chính phủ chia sẻ quyền lực tổng thể, chia sẻ quyền lực đề xuất và chia sẻ quyền lực phê duyệt. Kết quả chính cho thấy các thống đốc Đảng Cộng hòa hoạt động tích cực hơn trong việc giảm thiểu quy định đối với thị trường lao động. Chúng tôi nhận thấy rằng các chính sách bị ảnh hưởng bởi tư tưởng đã bị đối kháng dưới chính phủ chia sẻ quyền lực tổng thể và chia sẻ quyền lực đề xuất.
Từ khóa
#tư tưởng đảng #chính phủ #kích thước chính phủ #quy định thị trường lao động #Hoa KỳTài liệu tham khảo
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