The participatory Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism

Journal of Mathematical Economics - Tập 44 - Trang 324-336 - 2008
Kiho Yoon1
1Department of Economics, Korea University, Anam-dong, Sungbuk-gu, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea

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