Strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanisms in one shot

Theoretical Computer Science - Tập 410 - Trang 1607-1615 - 2009
Paolo Penna1, Guido Proietti2,3, Peter Widmayer4
1Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni “Renato M. Capocelli”, Università di Salerno, Italy
2Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di L’Aquila, Italy
3Istituto di Analisi dei Sistemi ed Informatica “A. Ruberti”, CNR, Roma, Italy
4Institut für Theoretische Informatik, ETH, Zürich, Switzerland

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