Representative Government and Special Interest Politics

Journal of Theoretical Politics - Tập 15 Số 3 - Trang 299-319 - 2003
Susanne Lohmann

Tóm tắt

In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistribution on most dimensions of public policy, including many dimensions on which the citizen is a member of the general public, the vast majority of citizens would surely be better off if the government did not cater to special interests at all. With this common interest in place, why do democratic societies have such a hard time ridding themselves of special interest politics? This article argues that the driving force underlying special interest politics is an information asymmetry: each citizen has a precise idea about the special interest handouts she is receiving and a vague idea about the price she is paying, as a member of the general public, for inefficient redistribution. I explain why special interest politics are ultimately impervious to reform (though we can tame them at the margin); I examine the trade-offs inherent in reform efforts (what it costs to tame them); and I spell out why special interest politics can be a Good Thing (why we should not tame them all the way even if we could).

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

10.1093/erae/19.1.1

10.1016/0047-2727(85)90063-5

Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press .

10.1086/466560

De Groot, Morris H. (1970) Optimal Statistical Decisions. New York: McGraw-Hill .

Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row .

Fiorina, Morris P. (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press .

10.2307/2297852

Hopenhayn, Hugo and Susanne Lohmann (1996) `Fire-alarm Signals and the Political Control of Regulatory Agencies' , Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12: 199-216 .

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Kimberly Ann Elliott (1994) Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics .

Lipton, Michael (1977) Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .

Lohmann, Susanne (1996) `Demosclerosis, or Special Interests “R” Us: An Information Rationale for Political Gridlock', in Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas (eds) The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation, pp. 119-130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .

10.2307/2586305

10.1111/1468-0343.00035

10.1006/game.1997.0623

10.1177/109114202238004

McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast (1987) `Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control' , Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 243-278 .

10.2307/2110792

10.2307/2296528

Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .

Ramsey, F. P. (1972) `A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation' , Economic Journal 37: 47-61 .

Rauch, Jonathan (1994) Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government. New York: Times Books .

10.2307/2297526

Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1978) The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press .

The Economist (1992) `A Survey of Agriculture' , 12 December, special insert.

The New York Times (1996) `President Wins Tomato Accord for Floridians' , 12 October: 1 .

10.1086/260997

10.1086/261660

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Tập 15 Số 3

299-319

Thông tin tác giả