Samantha Bouwmeester1,2, Peter P. J. L. Verkoeijen1,2, Balázs Aczél1,2, Fernando Barbosa1,2, Laurent Bègue3, Pablo Brañas‐Garza1,2, Thorsten Chmura1,2, Gert Cornelissen1,2, F. S. Døssing1,2, Antonio M. Espín1,2, Anthony M. Evans1,2, Fernando Ferreira‐Santos1,2, Susann Fiedler1,2, Jaroslav Flegr1,2, Minou Ghaffari1,2, Andreas Glöckner1,2, Timo Goeschl1,2, Lisa Guo1,2, Oliver Hauser1,2, Roberto Hernán-González1,2, Ana Herrero4, Zachary Horne1,2, Petr Houdek1,2, Magnus Johannesson1,2, Lina Koppel1,2, Praveen Kujal1,2, Tei Laine5, Johannes Lohse1,2, Eva Costa Martins1,2, Charles V. Mauro1,2, Dorothee Mischkowski1,2, Sumitava Mukherjee1,2, Kristian Ove R. Myrseth1,2, D. Navarro-Martínez1,2, Tess M. S. Neal1,2, Julie Nováková1,2, R. Pagà1,2, Tiago O. Paiva1,2, Bence Pálfi1,2, Marco Piovesan1,2, Rima-Maria Rahal1,2, Erika Salomon1,2, Narayanan Srinivasan6, A. Srivastava7, B. Szaszi1,2, Aba Szollosi1,2, K. Ø. Thor1,2, Gustav Tinghög1,2, Jennifer S. Trueblood1,2, Jay J. Van Bavel1,2, Anna van 't Veer1,2, Daniel Västfjäll1,2, Mary Warner1,2, Erik Wengström1,2, Julian Wills1,2, Conny Wollbrant1,2
1Avans University of Applied Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands
2Department of Psychology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands/Learning and Innovation Center,
3LIP-PC2S - Laboratoire Inter-universitaire de Psychologie : Personnalité, Cognition, Changement Social (Université Grenoble Alpes BP 47 – 38040 GRENOBLE Cedex 9 - FRANCE / Université Savoie Mont Blanc BP 1104 - 73011 CHAMBERY - France)
4Departamento de Ecología e Hidrología (Murcia 30100 - Espagne)
5Aquaculture and Fisheries Group (Pays-Bas)
6Molecular Biophysics Unit (Bangalore 560 012 - Inde)
7INRES - Institute of Crop Science and Resource Conservation [Bonn] (Katzenburgweg 1, D-53115 Bonn - Allemagne)
Tóm tắt
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
