Ảnh hưởng thực tiễn của việc thận trọng trong kiểm toán

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 26 - Trang 730-771 - 2021
Mahfuz Chy1, Ole-Kristian Hope2,3
1Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business, University of Missouri, Columbia, USA
2Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
3BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway

Tóm tắt

Chúng tôi nghiên cứu ảnh hưởng của việc thận trọng trong kiểm toán đến đổi mới sáng tạo trong doanh nghiệp. Chúng tôi giả thuyết rằng, vì các kiểm toán viên thận trọng kềm chế quyền lựa chọn kế toán làm tăng thu nhập, các nhà quản lý có thể hy sinh các khoản đầu tư dài hạn vào đổi mới để tăng cường lợi nhuận hiện tại và đáp ứng các mục tiêu hiệu suất ngắn hạn. Bằng cách khai thác các cú sốc trách nhiệm pháp lý của kiểm toán viên ở cấp bang như một phương tiện để xác định, chúng tôi tìm thấy bằng chứng phù hợp với giả thuyết này. Các phân tích theo cắt ngang cho thấy rằng ảnh hưởng tiêu cực của việc gia tăng tính thận trọng trong kiểm toán đối với đổi mới sáng tạo của doanh nghiệp trở nên rõ ràng hơn khi các công ty khách hàng chịu áp lực lớn hơn từ thị trường vốn và nợ, khi các công ty khách hàng phải đối mặt với rủi ro kiện tụng cao hơn, và khi các công ty khách hàng được kiểm toán bởi các kiểm toán viên lớn. Nghiên cứu của chúng tôi nhấn mạnh cách mà các kiểm toán viên, với vai trò là những giám sát viên bên ngoài, không chỉ có thể ảnh hưởng đến chất lượng báo cáo tài chính của khách hàng mà còn có thể gây ra những thay đổi trong hoạt động thực tế của họ.

Từ khóa

#thận trọng trong kiểm toán #đổi mới sáng tạo #trách nhiệm pháp lý #áp lực thị trường vốn #kiện tụng #kiểm toán viên lớn

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