Springer Science and Business Media LLC

This paper studies the effect of timing and commitment of verification in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. To acquire additional information about the agent’s behavior, the principal possesses a costly technology that produces a noisy signal about the agent’s effort choice. The precision of this signal is affected by the principal’s verification effort. Two verification procedures are discussed: monitoring where the principal verifies the agent’s behavior simultaneously with his effort choice and auditing where the principal can condition her verification effort on the realized outcome. As it is well known, the principal prefers to audit the agent’s behavior if she can commit to her verification effort at the time of contracting. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of commitment by the principal to her verification effort. In particular, I show that, when the principal cannot commit to her verification effort ex-ante, the principal strictly prefers monitoring to auditing if the gains from choosing high effort are sufficiently high.

This study investigates firms’ decisions to disclose accruals information in earnings press releases versus to provide it only in 10-Q filings and the impact of this disclosure on the pricing of accruals. I find that firms disclose accruals in their press releases when earnings alone are a weak indication of cash flow performance and that following these disclosures the accruals information is fully impounded into stock prices. The evidence suggests that when investor demand for accruals is likely to exist and firms disclose the information in earnings press releases, the mispricing typically associated with accruals is mitigated.

Exploiting an exogenous decrease in analyst access to private information, we show that firms with analyst following (test firms) experience a significant reduction in R&D investment, relative to firms without analyst following (control firms), after Reg FD. We also document that the negative impact on firms’ R&D investment after Reg FD is borne out in firms’ innovation outputs measured by patents. Additional analysis reveals that the decrease in R&D investment concentrates among test firms followed by influential analysts who likely had access to private information before Reg FD and among test firms facing disincentives to invest in R&D due to takeover pressure. Our inferences remain robust to various tests addressing potential bias arising from possible systematic differences between test and control firms. Overall this study demonstrates that private disclosures of R&D information through analysts mitigate managers’ R&D investment disincentives and facilitate innovation but that this channel is impeded by Reg FD.

Residual income subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. Residual income can be calculated each period from current accounting information, unlike discounted cash flow (DCF), which requires the knowledge of future cash flows. This paper provides a normative justification for residual-income maximization by showing that if investment decisions are made myopically each period to maximize residual income, the resulting path asymptotically maximizes discounted cash flow. Thus, under the assumptions of the model, residual-income maximization is a heuristic that leads to the long-run DCF-optimum.

Carona (2008) investigates the roles of nonfinancial performance indicators and long-term commitments in an incentive contracting setting. The paper develops a multiperiod agency model in which nonfinancial performance indicators are shown to be valuable in providing the agent with desirable incentives. The relative importance of nonfinancial measures depends on the level of commitment that the principal and the agent can sustain. While long-term contracts are more efficient than short-term contracts, the analysis shows that a sequence of overlapping medium-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term contracts. In this discussion, I provide a brief review of the related streams of literature and discuss the paper’s contributions to them. The discussion also illustrates the intuition behind the paper’s main findings through a simple example and raises questions for future research.

SFAS No. 115 requires firms to recognize available-for-sale (AFS) securities at fair value with accumulated unrealized gains and losses (AUGL) recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income. Firms reclassify AUGL to net income when they realize gains and losses. We refer to the amount reclassified each period by “RECLASS.” As of 1998, SFAS No. 130 requires firms to present RECLASS prominently in their financial statements. We investigate the incremental explanatory power of RECLASS for banks’ market values and market-adjusted returns. In the market value analysis, we control for AUGL, other components of book value of equity, net income before extraordinary items and RECLASS (NIBEXother), and other components of comprehensive income. In the returns analysis, we control for ΔAUGL, ΔNIBEXother, and extraordinary items. We find high positive coefficients on RECLASS in both analyses, consistent with investors pricing RECLASS as a relatively permanent component of net income. Exploring possible explanations for these pricing implications, we find no evidence that they are attributable to RECLASS remedying unreliable fair value measurement of AUGL. We provide three distinct analyses indicating that RECLASS’s pricing implications are explained in significant part by it helping investors predict banks’ future performance. Our results illustrate that an important type of amortized cost accounting information, realized gains and losses, remains highly useful to investors despite the overall fair-value-accounting framework for AFS securities.

This paper examines the effectiveness of three transfer pricing methodologies for an intangible asset that is developed through bilateral, sequential investment. In general, a royalty-based transfer price that can be renegotiated provides better investment incentives than either a non-negotiable royalty-based transfer price or a purely negotiated transfer price, and in some cases induces first-best investment. This result contrasts with previous research that finds that the inability to limit renegotiation of initial contracts reduces investment efficiency. Further, I examine how tax transfer pricing rules inform optimal internal transfer prices when the firm decouples internal and external transfer prices.