Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori

Casullo, A. (2003). A priori justification. Oxford University Press.

De Toffoli, S. (2021). Groundwork for a fallibilist account of mathematics. The Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4), 823–844.

Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 48(1), 15–34.

Field, C. (2019). It’s OK to make mistakes: Against the fixed point thesis. Episteme, 16(2), 175–185.

Field, C. (2020). Anti-exceptionalism about requirements of epistemic rationality. Acta Analytica, 36(3), 423–441.

Field, C. (2021). Giving up the enkratic principle. Logos and Episteme, 12(1), 7–28.

Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. MIT Press.

Ichikawa, J. J., & Jarvis, B. (2013). The rules of thought. Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, P. (1980). A priori knowledge. Philosophical Review, 89(1), 3–23.

Kitcher, P. (2000). A priori knowledge revisited. In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press.

Littlejohn, C. (2018). Stop making sense? On a puzzle about rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(2), 257–272.

Mele, A. (2003). Agents’ abilities. Noûs, 37(3), 447–470.

Priest, G. (1979). The logic of paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 219–241.

Priest, G. (1986). Contradiction, belief and rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 86(1), 99–116.

Priest, G. (2006). Doubt truth to be a liar. Oxford University Press.

Smithies, D. (2015). Ideal rationality and logical omniscience. Synthese, 192(9), 2769–2793.

Summerfield, D. (1991). Modest a priori knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51(1), 39–66.

Titelbaum, M. (2015). Rationality’s fixed point. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5, 253–294.

Whiting, D. (2021). The range of reasons. In Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press.