Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech Titans, Labor Markets

Journal of Economic Perspectives - Tập 33 Số 3 - Trang 69-93 - 2019
Carl Shapiro1
1Carl Shapiro is a Professor at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, California. He served as the chief economist at the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice during 1995–1996 and 2011–2013 and as a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during 2011–2012. He has also served as an economic consultant for the government and for private parties on a variety of antitrust matters over the years.

Tóm tắt

Accumulating evidence points to the need for more vigorous antitrust enforcement in the United States in three areas. First, stricter merger control is warranted in an economy where large, highly efficient and profitable “superstar” firms account for an increasing share of economic activity. Evidence from merger retrospectives further supports the conclusion that stricter merger control is needed. Second, greater vigilance is needed to prevent dominant firms, including the tech titans, from engaging in exclusionary conduct. The systematic shrinking of the scope of the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court over the past 40 years may make this difficult. Third, greater antitrust scrutiny should be given to the monopsony power of employers in labor markets.

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Thông tin xuất bản

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Tập 33 Số 3

69-93

Thông tin tác giả