Predicate Change
Tóm tắt
Like belief revision, conceptual change has rational aspects. The paper discusses this for predicate change. We determine the meaning of predicates by a set of imaginable instances, i.e., conceptually consistent entities that fall under the predicate. Predicate change is then an alteration of which possible entities are instances of a concept. The recent exclusion of Pluto from the category of planets is an example of such a predicate change. In order to discuss predicate change, we define a monadic predicate logic with three different kinds of lawful belief: analytic laws, which hold for all possible instances; doxastic laws, which hold for the most plausible instances; and typicality laws, which hold for typical instances. We introduce predicate changing operations that alter the analytic laws of the language and show that the expressive power is not affected by the predicate change. One can translate the new laws into old laws and vice versa. Moreover, we discuss rational restrictions of predicate change. These limit its possible influence on doxastic and typicality laws. Based on the results, we argue that predicate change can be quite conservative and sometimes even hardly recognisable.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Alchourron, C.E., Gärdenfors, P., Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2), 510–530.
Baltag, A., & Renne, B. (2016). Dynamic epistemic logic. In Zalta, EN (Ed.) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, winter 2016 edn, metaphysics research lab. Stanford: stanford university.
Baltag, A., Moss, L.S., Solecki, S. (1998). The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions. In Proceedings of the 7th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge (pp. 43–56). Burlington: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
van Benthem, J. (2004). Belief revision and dynamic logic. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 14(2), 1–25.
van Benthem, J. (2011). Logical dynamics of information and interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Benthem, J., van Eijck, J., Kooi, B. (2006). Logics of communication and change. Information and Computation, 204(11), 1620–1662.
Carey, S. (2009). The origin of concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carnap, R. (1928). Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Felix Meiner, Berlin.
Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carnap, R. (1955). Meaning and synonymy in natural languages. Philosophical studies, 6(3), 33–47.
van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., Kooi, B. (2007). Dynamic epistemic logic. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fleck, L. (1979). Genesis and development of a scientific fact. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hall, B.K. (1999). The paradoxical platypus. BicoScience, 49(3), 211–218.
Hampton, J.A. (1987). Inheritance of attributes in natural concept conjunctions. Memory & Cognition, 15(1), 55–71.
Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., Magidor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44(1-2), 167–207.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lewis, C.I. (1943). The modes of meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(2), 236–250.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. a philosophical study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Linné, C. (1735). Systema naturae 1. http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org.
Linné, C. (1758). Systema naturae 10, pt. 1.http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org, .
Makinson, D., & Hawthorne, J. (2015) In Koslow, A., & Buchsbaum, A. (Eds.), Lossy inference rules and their bounds: a brief review, (pp. 385–407). Birkhäuser: Cham.
Quine, W.V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60(1), 20–43.
Rosch, E. (1973). Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 328–350.
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C.B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 573–605.
Rott, H. (2009). Shifting priorities: Simple representations for twenty-seven iterated theory change operators. In Makinson, D, Malinowski, J, Wansing, H (Eds.), Towards mathematical philosophy (pp. 269–296). Dordrecht: Springer.
Schurz, G. (2001). What is ‘normal’? An evolution-theoretic foundation for normic laws and their relation to statistical normality. Philosophy of Science, 68, 476–497.
Schurz, G. (2012). Prototypes and their composition from an evolutionary point of view. In Hinzen w, & Machery, E (Eds.) (pp. 530–553). Oxford: The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality, Oxford University Press.
Strößner, C. (2015). Normality and majority: Towards a statistical understanding of normality statements. Erkenntnis, 80(4), 793–809.
Thagard, P. (1992). Conceptual revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Veltman, F. (1996). Defaults in update semantics. Journal of philosophical logic, 25(3), 221–261.